Gandt

Updating after roll-over of question. Also, reducing tail risks quite a but after some sort of stability seems ot have returned to gas markets (although I don't really understand why)

I consider this very unlikely - it would essentially mean the start of WW3, which Russia can't win. I consider the start of WW3 in the next year to be around ~2% right now, strongly informed by [1]. There might be some fringe scenarios of accidents escalating or Russia doing some increadibly stupid things, but all in all this simply seems very unlikely. I'll do a more elaborate analysis of this question in future weeks if I find the time.

[1]: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/KRFXjCqqfGQAYirm5/samotsvety-nuclear-risk-forecasts-march-2022

I spoke to an acquaintance of mine who works in EU foreign policy ~2 weeks ago about this question. Their take was:

The risk of the conflict extending to Georgia is low because

• The redeployment of Russian troops from South Ossetia to Ukraine [1] is actually difficult to reverse on medium timelines. This suggests that the withdrawal is a credible signal of de-escalation there
• With the progressing depletion of the Russian military, the war will trend towards lower-tech equipment [10,11], which makes it even more difficult to quickly replenish troops in Georgia. I think this is somewhat corroborated by the new Russian offensive in the Donbas.
• The withdrawal of troops from the Azeri / Armenian theatre [12] also suggests that there is a pivot away from the areas which are further away from Ukraine
• They thought it overall unlikely that Georgia would intervene if South Ossetia tried to secede
• Georgia is probably used as a major route to evade sanctions [2] and Russia wouldn’t want to jeopardise that

The risk of conflict in Moldova is harder to evaluate

• It depends a lot on Russian success on the southern front
• The Russian troops in Transnistria are badly equipped [3], making it less likely that they will be used for a pincer, which also decreases the chance that Moldova gets drawn into the conflict.
• It’s pretty hard for Russia to get new equipment to Transnistria (except through Ukraine)
• It’s plausible that Putin will use the annexation of Transitria as an “off-ramp” to the conflict, i.e. a more easily achievable success he could use to claim some kind of victory; however, this argument is less persuasive than it looks because my acquaintance thinks that spring of last year is too little time for this scenario to actively play out
• The fact that Russia struggles to get Belarus [4] involved in the war lowers the likelihood that it will be more successful with activating pro-Russian elements in Transnistria
• But if Russia is successful in Ukraine, the Russian narrative of protecting the integrity of the Russian people suggests that it will take the conflict to Moldova next

In addition to the above, the Moldovan / Transnistrian side of the conflict is heating up.

• Transnistria reported multiple explosions last week [5,6]
• As a response, they have mobilised their adult male population as military reserves [7]
• A few days ago, a Russian general alluded to plans to annex Transnistria after a landbridge was established [8]. This kind of confirms earlier indications from a presentation by Lukashenko that there are plans from the Russian side in this direction [9].

All of this makes it much more likely in my view that the conflict will spill over to Moldova

The above moves me to update away from Georgia being drawn into the conflict, down to 22%. For Moldova, I’m updating my probability upwards, to 72% due to the recent incidents. If tensions in Moldova subside again, I’ll move down again, given that Russia’s advance on the southern front doesn’t seem to go very well.

The above yields 22% for “neither”, 56% for “Moldova only”, 16% for “both, and 6% for “Georgia only”

[1]: https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3443537-russia-redeploys-troops-from-occupied-territories-of-georgia-to-ukraine.html

[2]: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-war-report-ukraine-accuses-georgia-of-allowing-russia-to-smuggle-but-lacks-evidence/

[3]: https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/03/15/expired-arms-tepid-fighters-russian-ally-transnistria-may-have-little-to-offer-for-putins-war/

[4]: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/belarusalert/wily-belarus-dictator-sees-putins-war-as-an-opportunity-to-end-his-isolation/

[5]: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/29/tensions-high-on-borders-of-moscow-backed-transnistria-region

[6]: https://theconversation.com/4-things-to-know-about-moldova-and-transnistria-and-why-russias-war-may-spread-beyond-ukraine-to-reach-them-soon-182030

[7]: https://balkaninsight.com/2022/04/28/moldovas-breakaway-transnistria-orders-general-mobilisation/

[8]: https://www.axios.com/moldova-deep-concern-russian-general-comments-9e6e2e26-7280-4020-9503-e0a3c4079b83.html

[9]: https://www.statecraft.co.in/article/putin-ally-lukashenko-unintentionally-reveals-russia-s-plans-to-invade-moldova

[10]: https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/22/russia-hypersonic-missiles-low-stockpile-00019358

[11]: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/even-with-sanctions-russia-can-afford-feed-its-war-machine-2022-04-12/

[12]: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13

@DKC made the argument that continued aggression against multiple countries could increase the likelihood of the West actively stepping in. While I don't think this is very likley, it shows that there are good arguments for a negative correlation between aggression in both countries, rather than a postive correlation as I have assumed before. I'm therefore moving back towards the "unbiassed" estimates of my previous probabilities (https://www.infer-pub.com/comments/36551)

I haven't heard much in recent months about the possiblity of Xi reviving the Party Chairman position (see here for prior reasoning: https://www.infer-pub.com/comments/27792). To the contrary, I have found this very interesting document arguing that it would likely be useless for him to do so: https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/Neil_Thomas_Testimony.pdf
I'm therefore moving down the probability of him doing so to 10% and, correspondingly, the probability of Xi remaining General Secretary back up to 87%.