

## **INFER Issue Report**

# Violent Non-State Actors Advancing Iran's Agenda

**March 2024**

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# Violent Non-State Actors Advancing Iran’s Agenda

Iran’s influence on violent non-state actors (VNSAs) like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis has long been a source of instability in the Middle East. This heatmap analyzes crowd forecasts from the signals below to show whether INFER’s forecasts indicate that VNSAs are advancing Iran’s agenda.

| <div>Decreasing Advancement</div> <div>Status Quo</div> <div>Increasing Advancement</div> |   |                  |                            |  |  |
|---|---|------------------|----------------------------|--|--|
| Drivers   | Signals   |                  | INFER Probability Forecast |  |  |
|   |   |                  | 31 Jan                     | 29 Feb                                 | 31 Mar                                     |
| Iranian Stability   | Anti-government protest takes place in Iran with 10,000 or more participants lasting at least a week                  |                  | 11%                        | 10%                                    | 11%  |
| Iranian International Relationships   | Iraq returns ambassador to Iran in next month   |                  | –                          | 15%                                    | 9%   |
| Threats to Iranian Allies   | Houthi rebels execute an attack against an Israeli civil or military vessel in the next six months                    |                  | 11%                        | 6%                                     | 12%  |
|   | Houthis and Yemen reach a ceasefire that is in effect on 31 December 2024 and lasts at least six months               |                  | 6%                         | 4%                                     | 3%   |
|   | Israel and Hamas agree on a 30-day or longer pause in the conflict before December 2024                               |                  | 47%                        | 61%                                    | 61%  |
|   | Israel declares war on Hezbollah in the next  | 6 months         | –                          | –                                      | 11%  |
|   |   | 12 months        | –                          | –                                      | 14%  |
|   | <b>[RESOLVED 31 MAR]</b> BP or Shell resumes oil shipments through the Red Sea by 31 March 2024                       |                  | –                          | 1%                                     | <b>DID NOT OCCUR</b><br>FINAL FORECAST: 0% |
|   | <b>[RESOLVED 18 MAR]</b> Houthi rebels launch a missile that strikes within Israel in the next six months             |                  | 14%                        | 7%                                     | <b>OCCURRED</b><br>FINAL FORECAST: 4%      |
|   | <b>[RESOLVED 26 FEB]</b> Hezbollah launches a missile that impacts more than 10 km into Israel in the next six months |                  | 37%                        | <b>OCCURRED</b><br>FINAL FORECAST: 84% | –  |
| Direct Threats to Iran  | Iran launches missiles or conducts an airstrike against U.S. forces in the next six months                            |                  | 4%                         | 2%                                     | 1%   |
|   | Iran launches missiles targeting Israel or conducts an airstrike in Israel in the next six months                     |                  | 3%                         | 1%                                     | 1%   |
|   | Israel and Saudi Arabia resume normalization process in the next six months   |                  | 4%                         | 2%                                     | 2%   |
| Iranian Economy   | <b>[RESOLVED 31 MAR]</b> Highest price per barrel of Brent crude oil between 4 December 2023 and 31 March 2024        | Less than \$90   | 60%                        | 81%                                    | <b>OCCURRED</b><br>FINAL FORECASTS: 96%    |
|   |   | \$90 - \$99.99   | 35%                        | 17%                                    | 4%   |
|   |   | \$100 - \$109.99 | 3%                         | 1%                                     | 0%   |
|   |   | \$110 - \$119.99 | 1%                         | 0%                                     | 0%   |
|   |   | \$120 or more    | 0%                         | 0%                                     | 0%   |

# Appendix

## Detailed Outputs Including Trend Charts and Rationale Summaries

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## A. Forecast Trend Charts and Rationale Summaries

## Will Israel declare war on Hezbollah in the next six months?


**Crowd Forecast:** 11% chance

### AI Summarization of Rationales

| Higher probability forecasts discuss...  | Lower probability forecasts discuss...  |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Israeli Preemptive Strike:</b> Israel could conduct a preemptive strike against Hezbollah to protect itself from an imminent attack.</li> <li>• <b>Netanyahu Power Play Tactics:</b> If Netanyahu faces threats of being removed from office, he may start a conflict with Hezbollah to stay in power.</li> <li>• <b>International Influence:</b> Netanyahu has shown willingness to use military force despite international condemnation.</li> <li>• <b>Israel-Lebanon Tensions:</b> Tensions along the Israel-Lebanon border have been escalating.</li> <li>• <b>Israeli Elections:</b> Continuing or escalating conflict may delay elections and keep Netanyahu's governing coalition in place.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Israeli Resources:</b> Israel lacks sufficient infantry to invade Lebanon and is already expending significant resources in its war against Hamas in Gaza.</li> <li>• <b>Potential for Regional Conflict:</b> Waging war on Hezbollah risks a larger regional conflict.</li> <li>• <b>Hezbollah's Military Power:</b> Hezbollah has significant military strength that Israel may want to avoid provoking.</li> <li>• <b>International Influence:</b> International pressure may deter Israel from escalating.</li> </ul> |

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

### Consensus Trend



## Crowd Forecast Profile

| Recency of Forecasts           |         | Participation Level                           |    | Accuracy                      |                  |
|--------------------------------|---------|---|----|-------------------------------|------------------|
| Question age                   | 18 days | Number of Forecasters                         | 39 | Participants in this question | better than      |
| Average forecast age           | 7 days  | Average for questions in their first 4 weeks: | 34 | vs. all forecasters           | average <b>1</b> |
| Forecasts in the last 24 hours | 7       | Number of Forecasts                           | 52 |                               |                  |
|                                |         | Average for questions in their first 4 weeks: | 46 |                               |                  |

## Will Israel declare war on Hezbollah in the next 12 months?


**Crowd Forecast:** 14% chance

### AI Summarization of Rationales

| Higher probability forecasts discuss...   | Lower probability forecasts discuss...  |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Israeli Preemptive Strike:</b> Israel could conduct a preemptive strike against Hezbollah to protect itself from an imminent attack.</li> <li>• <b>Netanyahu Power Play Tactics:</b> Netanyahu may look to start a conflict with Hezbollah to legitimize staying in power if he faces threats of removal.</li> <li>• <b>Hezbollah Military Threat Increasing:</b> Hezbollah's strengthening military capabilities pose an increasing threat to Israel.</li> <li>• <b>Israeli Territorial Expansion Goals:</b> Netanyahu's government may escalate conflict to gain control of more land in the region.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Israeli Resources:</b> Israel lacks the resources and support for a new war given the ongoing conflict in Gaza.</li> <li>• <b>Need for Iran's Support:</b> Hezbollah is unlikely to provoke Israel into war without backing from Iran.</li> <li>• <b>Cost of War:</b> Both sides want to avoid the high costs of full-scale war.</li> <li>• <b>Israel's Position in Gaza:</b> Declaring war could weaken Israel's position in the Gaza conflict.</li> </ul> |

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

### Consensus Trend



### Crowd Forecast Profile

| Recency of Forecasts              |         | Participation Level                              |    | Accuracy   |                          |
|-----------------------------------|---------|--|----|--|--------------------------|
| Question age                      | 18 days | Number of Forecasters                            | 44 | Participants in this question<br>vs. all forecasters | better than<br>average ⓘ |
| Average forecast age              | 8 days  | Average for questions in their first 4 weeks: 34 |    |  |                          |
| Forecasts in the last<br>24 hours | 7       | Number of Forecasts                              | 54 |  |                          |
|                                   |         | Average for questions in their first 4 weeks: 46 |    |  |                          |



## Will Iraq return its ambassador to Iran in the next month?


**Crowd Forecast:** 9% chance

### AI Summarization of Rationales

| Higher probability forecasts discuss...   | Lower probability forecasts discuss...  |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Report of Imminent Return:</b> A report claimed the Iraqi ambassador is set to return to Tehran imminently, indicating tensions are easing.</li> <li>• <b>Historical Relations:</b> Iraq and Iran have close ties historically, so their relations may normalize soon.</li> <li>• <b>Benefits for Iraq:</b> Not returning an ambassador doesn't benefit Iraq diplomatically.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Strained Relations:</b> The recent attacks by Iranian proxies violated Iraqi sovereignty, causing deaths, straining relations.</li> <li>• <b>Typical Reinstatement Timeline:</b> It usually takes 2-3 months to return an ambassador after withdrawal.</li> <li>• <b>Evidence vs. Claims:</b> There is no evidence the return has occurred despite claims it was imminent.</li> </ul> |

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

### Consensus Trend



### Crowd Forecast Profile

| Recency of Forecasts           |          | Participation Level                                |     | Accuracy  |                       |
|--------------------------------|----------|--|-----|---|-----------------------|
| Question age                   | 2 months | Number of Forecasters                              | 56  | Participants in this question vs. all forecasters | better than average ⓘ |
| Average forecast age           | 17 days  | Average for questions in their first 3 months: 48  |     |   |                       |
| Forecasts in the last 24 hours | 4        | Number of Forecasts                                | 147 |   |                       |
|                                |          | Average for questions in their first 3 months: 101 |     |   |                       |

Will there be an agreed-upon pause in the conflict between Israel and Hamas that starts before 1 December 2024 and lasts at least 30 days?


**Crowd Forecast:** 61% chance

AI Summarization of Rationales

| Higher probability forecasts discuss...  | Lower probability forecasts discuss...   |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Ceasefire talks:</b> There are ongoing ceasefire negotiations between Israel, Hamas, Egypt, Qatar, and the U.S., with some progress being made toward an initial deal for a 6-week truce and hostage exchange.</li> <li>• <b>Pressure on Israel:</b> The U.S. and other allies like Egypt are applying diplomatic pressure on Israel to agree to a ceasefire.</li> <li>• <b>Egypt's deadline:</b> Egypt has given both sides a deadline to reach an agreement before Israel invades Rafah, which could lead to progress.</li> <li>• <b>Hamas' flexibility:</b> Hamas appears willing to show some flexibility in its demands, indicating a ceasefire is possible.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Israel commitment:</b> Israel remains committed to fully defeating Hamas militarily before agreeing to any ceasefire.</li> <li>• <b>Hamas' demands:</b> Hamas has insisted on maximalist demands like lifting the blockade on Gaza.</li> <li>• <b>Low trust:</b> Trust between the two sides remains low, making an enduring ceasefire agreement difficult.</li> <li>• <b>Pressure on Israel:</b> Netanyahu faces domestic political pressures not to agree to a ceasefire.</li> </ul> |

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Consensus Trend



## Crowd Forecast Profile

| Recency of Forecasts           |          | Participation Level                            |     | Accuracy                      |                  |
|--------------------------------|----------|--|-----|-------------------------------|------------------|
| Question age                   | 4 months | Number of Forecasters                          | 132 | Participants in this question | better than      |
| Average forecast age           | 1 month  | Average for questions in their first 6 months: | 55  | vs. all forecasters           | average <b>1</b> |
| Forecasts in the last 24 hours | 7        | Number of Forecasts                            | 565 |                               |                  |
|                                |          | Average for questions in their first 6 months: | 156 |                               |                  |

# Will Houthi rebels execute an attack against an Israeli civil or military vessel in the next six months?


**Crowd Forecast:** 12% chance

## AI Summarization of Rationales

| Higher probability forecasts discuss...  | Lower probability forecasts discuss...   |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Houthi Solidarity with Palestinians:</b> The Houthis have declared solidarity with Palestinians and have already launched multiple attacks and vowed more against Israel. They appear to have the capability, motivation and opportunity to strike Israeli shipping.</li> <li>• <b>Iranian Proxies:</b> Iran actively supports and supplies the Houthis, likely wanting to use them against Israel. This aligns with Iran's interests.</li> <li>• <b>"Nothing to lose":</b> The Houthis are following an "I have nothing to lose" attitude and will keep trying to hit Israeli vessels.</li> <li>• <b>Proximity of the Red Sea:</b> The Red Sea/Gulf of Aden region is much closer to the Houthis than Israel is.</li> <li>• <b>Already Seized Ships:</b> Houthis have already seized and attacked ships ostensibly linked to Israel, demonstrating their capability.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Israeli Ships Avoiding Yemeni Waters:</b> There are very few Israeli flagged ships that travel near Yemeni waters where the Houthis operate. Israel is minimizing risks by avoiding the area.</li> <li>• <b>Houthis Lacking Accuracy:</b> The Houthis have limited intelligence capabilities to identify Israeli ships and lack accuracy in their weapons. Most Houthi attacks have failed so far.</li> <li>• <b>U.S. Naval Presence:</b> The U.S. and allies have a strong naval presence in the region now, which makes a successful Houthi attack less likely, as they will likely intercept threats.</li> <li>• <b>Houthis Tensions With Saudi Coalition:</b> The Houthis could lose focus on Israel if tensions escalate with the Saudi coalition they are fighting in Yemen's civil war. Their attacks seem opportunistic and random rather than carefully planned.</li> </ul> |

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

## Consensus Trend



## Crowd Forecast Profile

| Recency of Forecasts              |          | Participation Level                                |     | Accuracy   |                          |
|-----------------------------------|----------|--|-----|--|--------------------------|
| Question age                      | 5 months | Number of Forecasters                              | 79  | Participants in this question<br>vs. all forecasters | better than<br>average ⓘ |
| Average forecast age              | 2 months | Average for questions in their first 6 months: 55  |     |  |                          |
| Forecasts in the last<br>24 hours | 1        | Number of Forecasts                                | 357 |  |                          |
|                                   |          | Average for questions in their first 6 months: 156 |     |  |                          |

In the next six months, will the Global Protest Tracker record an anti-government protest in Iran with 10,000 or more participants lasting at least a week?


**Crowd Forecast: 11% chance**

AI Summarization of Rationales

| Higher probability forecasts discuss...   | Lower probability forecasts discuss...  |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Public Discontent:</b> There is widespread discontent among Iranians over economic hardship, political repression, human rights violations, and the current regime. This provides a foundation for large anti-government protests.</li> <li>• <b>Iran's Poor Economy:</b> The poor economic situation, including high inflation, poverty, and unemployment, creates conditions for unrest.</li> <li>• <b>Regime Crackdowns:</b> The Iranian regime's harsh crackdowns and executions in response to recent protests indicate fear of further unrest, and could spark backlash.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Suppressing Protests:</b> Recent protests have been suppressed, and the regime appears to have stabilized, making large-scale organizing difficult.</li> <li>• <b>China-Saudi Arabia Relations:</b> Iran's improved relations with China and Saudi Arabia have helped resolve some economic issues.</li> <li>• <b>Iran's Support for Hamas:</b> Involvement in the Israel-Hamas conflict could unite Iranians behind the regime for now.</li> <li>• <b>Regime Retaliation:</b> Fear of retaliation from harsh crackdowns may deter Iranians from protesting.</li> </ul> |

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Consensus Trend



## Crowd Forecast Profile

| Recency of Forecasts              |          | Participation Level                                |     | Accuracy   |                          |
|-----------------------------------|----------|--|-----|--|--------------------------|
| Question age                      | 5 months | Number of Forecasters                              | 63  | Participants in this question<br>vs. all forecasters | better than<br>average ⓘ |
| Average forecast age              | 1 month  | Average for questions in their first 6 months: 55  |     |  |                          |
| Forecasts in the last<br>24 hours | 2        | Number of Forecasts                                | 233 |  |                          |
|                                   |          | Average for questions in their first 6 months: 156 |     |  |                          |

Will the Houthi movement and Yemen reach a ceasefire that is in effect on 31 December 2024 and lasts at least six months?


**Crowd Forecast:** 3% chance

AI Summarization of Rationales

| Higher probability forecasts discuss...   | Lower probability forecasts discuss...   |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Cost of War:</b> Saudi Arabia wants to exit the costly war in Yemen and is willing to compromise to reach a ceasefire agreement, as indicated by past attempts at negotiations between the parties.</li> <li>• <b>UN Negotiations:</b> The UN is actively involved in facilitating negotiations between the warring parties, which could help them reach a sustained ceasefire agreement.</li> <li>• <b>Previous Ceasefire:</b> Both the Houthis and the Yemeni government observed a previous ceasefire from April to October 2022, suggesting a willingness to halt fighting.</li> <li>• <b>Humanitarian Devastation:</b> The dire humanitarian situation and devastation from years of war could motivate both sides to agree to a ceasefire.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Israel-Hamas war:</b> Ongoing hostilities between Israel and Hamas make a ceasefire less likely, as the Houthis align with Hamas against Israel.</li> <li>• <b>Negotiations Far Apart:</b> Major differences remain between the Houthis and Yemeni government in ceasefire negotiations.</li> <li>• <b>Houthi Strikes in Red Sea:</b> The Houthis continue missile strikes and attacks in the Red Sea region, escalating tensions.</li> <li>• <b>Iran Proxies:</b> Iran's involvement and support for the Houthis could prolong the conflict.</li> </ul> |

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Consensus Trend





## Crowd Forecast Profile

| Recency of Forecasts              |          | Participation Level                                |     | Accuracy   |                          |
|-----------------------------------|----------|--|-----|--|--------------------------|
| Question age                      | 5 months | Number of Forecasters                              | 47  | Participants in this question<br>vs. all forecasters | better than<br>average ⓘ |
| Average forecast age              | 1 month  | Average for questions in their first 6 months: 55  |     |  |                          |
| Forecasts in the last<br>24 hours | 3        | Number of Forecasts                                | 228 |  |                          |
|                                   |          | Average for questions in their first 6 months: 156 |     |  |                          |

# Will Iran launch missiles or conduct an airstrike against U.S. forces in the next six months?


**Crowd Forecast:** 1% chance

## AI Summarization of Rationales

| Higher probability forecasts discuss...  | Lower probability forecasts discuss...  |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Iranian Proxy Attacks:</b> Escalating proxy attacks against U.S. forces show Iran may be moving towards more direct confrontation.</li> <li>• <b>Iran's Direct Attacks:</b> Iran recently attacked targets in Syria, Iraq, and Pakistan openly rather than through proxies, representing a shift.</li> <li>• <b>Israel-Hamas War:</b> Ongoing Israel-Hamas war risks further regional escalation involving Iran.</li> <li>• <b>Iran-U.S. Relations:</b> Iran has motive to confront the U.S. and push them out of the region.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Iran's Preference for Proxies:</b> Iran prefers to use proxy forces and covert action to avoid direct conflict.</li> <li>• <b>Desire to Avoid Escalation:</b> Neither Iran nor the U.S. want open war, and both sides are trying to avoid escalation.</li> <li>• <b>Sanctions:</b> An open attack would be counterproductive to Iran's goal of sanctions relief.</li> <li>• <b>Iran's Preference for Influence:</b> Iran is focused on influencing events through allies, not direct strikes.</li> <li>• <b>U.S. Elections:</b> Upcoming U.S. elections make provocations by Iran unlikely, as they may not want to destabilize the situation with the U.S. at a time where they would be forced to respond.</li> </ul> |

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

## Consensus Trend



## Crowd Forecast Profile

| Recency of Forecasts           |          | Participation Level                                |     | Accuracy   |                          |
|--------------------------------|----------|--|-----|--|--------------------------|
| Question age                   | 5 months | Number of Forecasters                              | 94  | Participants in this question<br>vs. all forecasters | better than<br>average ⓘ |
| Average forecast age           | 1 month  | Average for questions in their first 6 months: 55  |     |  |                          |
| Forecasts in the last 24 hours | 4        | Number of Forecasts                                | 342 |  |                          |
|                                |          | Average for questions in their first 6 months: 156 |     |  |                          |

# Will Iran launch missiles targeting Israel or conduct an airstrike in Israel in the next six months?


**Crowd Forecast:** 2% chance

## AI Summarization of Rationales

| Higher probability forecasts discuss...   | Lower probability forecasts discuss...   |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Iran's Missile Capability:</b> Iran recently launched surveillance satellites that suggest a capability to produce intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of hitting Israel, which could lead Iran to a preemptive strike against Israel.</li> <li>• <b>Israeli or U.S. provocation:</b> Escalation of the conflict by Israel or the U.S. in response to Iranian proxy attacks may provoke a direct response from Iran.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Preference for Proxies:</b> Iran has demonstrated a consistent pattern of operating through proxies like Hezbollah and Houthis rather than direct military action against Israel.</li> <li>• <b>Desire to Avoid War:</b> Iran wants to avoid getting dragged into a direct war with Israel or the U.S.</li> <li>• <b>Potential for Humiliation:</b> A failed or intercepted attack would be humiliating for Iran.</li> <li>• <b>Risk of Realigning Allies With Israel:</b> Israel's actions are leading it to lose support from allies, so a direct attack now could bring allies closer to Israel.</li> <li>• <b>Iran's Refueling Capabilities:</b> Iran lacks aerial refueling capabilities needed for airstrikes against Israel.</li> </ul> |

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

## Consensus Trend



## Crowd Forecast Profile

| Recency of Forecasts           |          | Participation Level                               |     | Accuracy  |                       |
|--------------------------------|----------|---|-----|---|-----------------------|
| Question age                   | 2 months | Number of Forecasters                             | 65  | Participants in this question vs. all forecasters | better than average ⓘ |
| Average forecast age           | 24 days  | Average for questions in their first 3 months: 48 |     |   |                       |
| Forecasts in the last 24 hours | 0        | Number of Forecasts                               | 138 |   |                       |
|                                |          | Average for questions in their first 3 months: 98 |     |   |                       |

Will Israel and Saudi Arabia publicly acknowledge that they are resuming the normalization process in the next six months?


**Crowd Forecast:** 2% chance

AI Summarization of Rationales

| Higher probability forecasts discuss...  | Lower probability forecasts discuss...  |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Previously Close to Normalization:</b> Before the Gaza conflict derailed talks, Israel and Saudi Arabia were close to normalizing relations. Announcing that talks are resuming is a relatively low bar.</li> <li>• <b>Common Interest Against Iran:</b> Saudi Arabia and Israel share common interests in countering Iran, so pragmatic factors may lead Saudi Arabia to resume dialogue despite public opposition.</li> <li>• <b>Potential in Near Future:</b> If the Gaza conflict ends soon, it could open a window for restarting normalization talks within six months.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Israel-Hamas War:</b> The ongoing conflict in Gaza makes it politically difficult for Saudi Arabia to be seen normalizing relations with Israel. The Saudi government needs the conflict to end and tensions to cool down before publicly resuming talks.</li> <li>• <b>Anti-Israel sentiment:</b> Anti-Israel sentiment is currently very high among the Saudi public due to Israel's actions in Gaza, making it risky for the Saudi government to acknowledge talks.</li> </ul> |

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Consensus Trend



## Crowd Forecast Profile


| Recency of Forecasts           |          | Participation Level                                |     | Accuracy   |                          |
|--------------------------------|----------|--|-----|--|--------------------------|
| Question age                   | 5 months | Number of Forecasters                              | 100 | Participants in this question<br>vs. all forecasters | better than<br>average ⓘ |
| Average forecast age           | 1 month  | Average for questions in their first 6 months: 55  |     |  |                          |
| Forecasts in the last 24 hours | 8        | Number of Forecasts                                | 365 |  |                          |
|                                |          | Average for questions in their first 6 months: 156 |     |  |                          |

## B. Resolved Questions

This section presents the forecast questions that have been resolved in 2024. A question is “resolved” when the outcome is known and forecasts can be judged for accuracy.

Will BP or Shell resume oil shipments through the Red Sea before 31 March 2024?


**Final Crowd Forecast:** Yes - 0%, No - 100% | **Correct Answer:** No



..... Correct answer became the crowd's highest probability answer - Feb 1, 2024 05:35PM (60 days before close, question was 0% complete)

Will Houthi rebels launch a missile that strikes within Israel in the next six months?


**Final Crowd Forecast:** Yes - 4%, No - 96% | **Correct Answer:** Yes





Will Hezbollah launch a missile that impacts more than 10 kilometers into Israel over the next six months?

**Final Crowd Forecast:** Yes - 84%, No - 16% | **Correct Answer:** Yes



..... Correct answer became the crowd's highest probability answer - Feb 18, 2024 05:24PM (8 days before close, question was 74% complete)

What will be the highest price per barrel of Brent crude oil between 4 December 2023 and 31 March 2024?

**Final Crowd Forecast:**


**[CORRECT ANSWER]** Less than \$90: 96% chance

\$90 - \$99.99: 4% chance

\$100 - \$109.99: 0% chance

\$110 - \$119.99: 0% chance

\$120 or more: 0% chance



..... Correct answer became the crowd's highest probability answer - Dec 5, 2023 05:17AM (118 days before close, question was 1% complete)

## C. Impact Assessment of Individual Signals

The following table shows INFER's interpretation of how each forecast signal **increases**, **decreases**, or **maintains** status quo conditions regarding Iran's influence on violent non-state actors (VNSA's).

| Topic                               | Signal / Forecast Question  | Possible Answer | Impact to Issue Outcome |
|-------------------------------------|---|-----------------|-------------------------|
| Iranian Stability                   | In the next six months, will the Global Protest Tracker record an anti-government protest in Iran with 10,000 or more participants lasting at least a week? | Yes             | Increases               |
|                                     |   | No              | Maintains status quo    |
| Iranian International Relationships | Will Iraq return its ambassador to Iran in the next month?  | Yes             | Increases               |
|                                     |   | No              | Maintains status quo    |
| Threats to Iranian Allies           | Will Houthi rebels execute an attack against an Israeli civil or military vessel in the next 6 months?  | Yes             | Increases               |
|                                     |   | No              | Maintains status quo    |
|                                     | Will Houthi rebels launch a missile that strikes within Israel in the next six months?  | Yes             | Increases               |
|                                     |   | No              | Maintains status quo    |
|                                     | Will the Houthi movement and Yemen reach a ceasefire that is in effect on 31 December 2024 and lasts at least six months?                                   | Yes             | Increases               |
|                                     |   | No              | Maintains status quo    |
|                                     | Will there be an agreed-upon pause in the conflict between Israel and Hamas that starts before 1 December 2024 and lasts at least 30 days?                  | Yes             | Increases               |
|                                     |   | No              | Maintains status quo    |

|                        |  |                  |                      |
|------------------------|--|------------------|----------------------|
|                        | Will Israel declare war on Hezbollah in the next ...   | 6 months         | Increases            |
|                        |  | 12 months        | Increases            |
|                        | Will Hezbollah launch a missile that impacts more than 10 kilometers into Israel over the next six months?                 | Yes              | Increases            |
|                        |  | No               | Maintains status quo |
|                        | Will BP or Shell resume oil shipments through the Red Sea before 31 March 2024?  | Yes              | Decreases            |
|                        |  | No               | Maintains status quo |
| Direct Threats to Iran | Will Iran launch missiles or conduct an airstrike against U.S. forces in the next six months?                              | Yes              | Increases            |
|                        |  | No               | Maintains status quo |
|                        | Will Iran launch missiles targeting Israel or conduct an airstrike in Israel in the next six months?                       | Yes              | Increases            |
|                        |  | No               | Maintains status quo |
|                        | Will Israel and Saudi Arabia publicly acknowledge that they are resuming the normalization process in the next six months? | Yes              | Increases            |
|                        |  | No               | Maintains status quo |
| Iranian Economy        | What will be the highest price per barrel of Brent crude oil between 4 December 2023 and 31 March 2024?                    | Less than \$90   | Maintains status quo |
|                        |  | \$90 - \$99.99   | Maintains status quo |
|                        |  | \$100 - \$109.99 | Increases            |
|                        |  | \$110 - \$119.99 | Increases            |
|                        |  | \$120 or more    | Increases            |

## D. The Forecasters

The forecasters who have participated thus far in these questions have the following profile:

- 294 forecasters made 4,017 total forecasts
- 55% of forecasts were made by “INFER Pros” - current participants in INFER’s Pro Forecaster Program, who were selected based on their accuracy track record of at least 1 year on INFER or other similar forecasting sites or programs.

### Demographics

| Country                            | % of Forecasters |
|------------------------------------|------------------|
| USA                                | 45%              |
| Canada, UK, Australia, New Zealand | 12%              |
| Europe (not UK)                    | 18%              |
| Latin America, Caribbean           | 14%              |
| Asia                               | 10%              |
| Africa                             | 1%               |

## E. Methodology for Rationale Summaries

Rationales of INFER forecasters have been selected and summarized by Claude, an AI assistant tool created by Anthropic. To build the rationale summaries presented in this report, we provided Claude with forecast probabilities and narrative rationales, which generated multi-sentence summaries and bulleted lists of arguments. We then manually edited the summaries for completeness and readability to ensure that they accurately represented forecasters' rationales.

[Interested in running your own decomposition? >>](#)