

INFER Issue Report

Will Iran develop a nuclear weapon?

October 2023

This report is a summation of crowd-sourced predictions. It should not be viewed as an analytic product.

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Will Iran develop a nuclear weapon?

1,693
FORECASTS

175
FORECASTERS

SUMMARY
INFER is tracking three drivers to analyze the probability of Iran developing a nuclear weapon: Iran’s external threat environment, internal preferences for developing a weapon, and international incentives/disincentives. According to INFER forecasters thus far, changes in Iran’s external threat environment have been mixed, as there is a decreased chance of Arab states establishing strong ties with Israel, but Hamas’ attack on Israel creates the possibility that Iran is targeted in retaliation. Internally, Iran maintains its commitment to enriching uranium, but there is only a remote assessed chance that the IAEA discovers enrichment to the 90% level needed for nuclear weapons. International incentives and disincentives to restrain Iran’s nuclear program remain limited, with a highly improbable risk of Iran leaving the JCPOA. While the Hamas attack on Oct 7 caused slight shifts to individual signals INFER is tracking, its overall impact remains to be seen.

What the crowd is forecasting as of 10 October 2023:

External Threat Environment

Threats to Iran’s national security, as well as military support from Russia and China.

	% CHANCE
Attack on an Iranian nuclear or missile facility in the next six months	12%
A Muslim-majority country signs an agreement establishing or normalizing relations with Israel by 31 Dec 2023	5%
Chance Mid East / North Africa country recognizes Israel’s statehood by 31 Dec 2024	
Saudi Arabia	10%
Oman	3%
Qatar	3%
Kuwait	2%
Tunisia	2%
Russia delivers missile systems or fighter jets to Iran before 1 Feb 2025	
S-400/S-500 missiles	9%
Su-35 fighter jets	8%

Internal Preferences in Iran

Potential leadership changes, economic pressure, and domestic opinion.

	% CHANCE
Ali Khamenei flees Iran or ceases to be Supreme Leader before 1 Mar 2024	2%
IAEA discovers uranium enriched to 90% or more in Iran by 31 Dec 2024	4%
Iran eliminates, reduces, or grows its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% by 31 Dec 2024	
Eliminates	0%
Reduces by 50%+	1%
Reduces by less than 50% or stays the same	14%
Increases	85%

International Incentives & Disincentives

Ongoing international agreements like the JCPOA and economic sanctions.

	% CHANCE
JCPOA participant country begins the process of imposing “snapback” sanctions on Iran by 31 Dec 2024	4%
Iran announces it will leave the JCPOA before 1 Jan 2025	17%
Iran agrees to limit uranium enrichment to 5% or less in next 6 months	1%

- Detailed forecast trends and rationales are on the following pages.
- Page 24 shows INFER’s underlying assessment of each signal’s impact (advances/mitigates/maintains status quo) on whether Iran develops a nuclear weapon.
- For more about our decomposition process, read our blog post [Forecasting Iran’s nuclear development](#).

Appendix


Detailed Outputs Including Trend Charts and Rationale Summaries

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A. Forecast Trend Charts and Rationale Summaries

Will there be an attack on an Iranian nuclear- or missile-related facility in the next 6 months?

Crowd Forecast: 12% chance



Higher probability forecasts discuss...

- **Israel perceives existential threat:** Israel sees Iran's nuclear program as an existential threat, and has attacked Iranian facilities in the past, including through air strikes, raids, and cyberattacks like Stuxnet. There is precedent for Israel taking unilateral action if it perceives Iran as getting too close to a nuclear weapon.
- **Continued Israel-Iran tensions:** Tensions between Israel and Iran remain high, with Israel accusing Iran of supporting groups like Hamas and Hezbollah that attack Israel. A recent flare-up between Israel and Hamas increased speculation that Israel could retaliate against Iran more directly.
- **Israel attack seen as opportunity:** Some forecasters argue Israel may see attacking Iran as an opportunity to look strong domestically amid political turmoil, or to gain international sympathy.
- **Cyberattacks more likely:** Cyberattacks on Iranian facilities may be more likely than physical strikes. These are deniable and

Lower probability forecasts discuss...

- **Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza:** Israel is currently focused on the war with Hamas in Gaza, which would make opening up a new front against Iran very difficult militarily and politically.
- **America focused on other issues:** The U.S. is focused on other major issues like Ukraine and China, and does not want additional conflicts distracting from those priorities.
- **Attacks may derail nuclear talks:** There are ongoing nuclear negotiations between Iran and world powers. An attack could derail any diplomatic progress.
- **Israel's normalization efforts with Gulf states:** Iran and Saudi Arabia recently normalized relations, and Israel wants to normalize ties with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. An attack on Iran would hurt these efforts.

Israel has sophisticated cyber capabilities.


[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	2 months	Number of Forecasters	68	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	20 days	Average for questions in their first 3 months: 47			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	2	Number of Forecasts	145		
		Average for questions in their first 3 months: 96			

Will any listed Muslim-majority country sign an agreement establishing or normalizing diplomatic relations with Israel in 2023?

Crowd Forecast: 5% chance



Higher probability forecasts discuss...

- **Saudi-Israel normalization talks:** Saudi Arabia has been in talks with the US and Israel about a potential normalization deal. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia has stated the possibility of establishing diplomatic ties with Israel, which would encourage other Arab states to follow.
- **Netanyahu predicted "historic peace":** In late September, Israeli PM Netanyahu said Israel was on the cusp of historic peace with Saudi Arabia.
- **Saudis seek U.S. defense pact:** Saudi Arabia wants to solidify a formal defense agreement with the U.S. in exchange for normalization. Even if it falls short of a NATO-style pact, they want binding security assurances.
- **Biden pushing for pre-election deal:** Biden has been pushing both Israel and Saudi Arabia to make concessions to advance a deal and offering incentives to both sides. A Saudi-Israel deal would be a diplomatic win for him before the 2024 election.

Lower probability forecasts discuss...

- **Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza:** In October, conflict broke out between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Recent Hamas rocket attacks on Israel and the escalating Israel-Gaza war make it politically difficult for Muslim countries to normalize ties now.
- **Arab states weighing Palestinian concerns:** Saudi Arabia and other Arab states cannot ignore Palestinian concerns and demands for statehood in exchange for normalization.
- **Israel's right-wing government:** Israel's new hardline government and controversial domestic policies, like judicial reforms, alienate potential normalization partners.
- **Deal unlikely in 2023:** Most forecasts see it as unlikely a deal can be finalized in the short 3-month timeframe left in 2023, even if progress continues into 2024.


[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	7 months	Number of Forecasters	89	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	1 month	Average for questions older than 6 months: 55			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	3	Number of Forecasts	480		
		Average for questions older than 6 months: 183			

Will a listed Middle Eastern / North African country recognize Israel's statehood by 31 Dec 2024?

Crowd Forecast: 10% chance (Saudi Arabia)



Higher probability forecasts discuss...

- **Saudi Arabia most likely:** Saudi Arabia is most likely to recognize Israel given ongoing high-level talks between the two countries and incentives like countering Iran. If Saudi Arabia recognizes Israel, it could encourage other Arab states to follow.
- **Economic incentives:** There are significant economic benefits to normalization with Israel, especially for Saudi Arabia. Opening up ties with Israel would provide access to trade, investment, technology, and tourism.
- **Existing unofficial ties:** Some countries like Qatar already have some unofficial ties with Israel, making official recognition more plausible. Qatar opened its airspace to Israel and mediated discussions between Israel and Hamas.
- **Precedent from previous agreements:** The Abraham Accords showed Arab states are willing to recognize Israel under the right conditions. The U.S. could incentivize recognition as it did for the Abraham Accords.

Lower probability forecasts discuss...

- **Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza:** The Israel-Hamas war that broke out in October 2023 following terror attacks on Israel has created ill will and makes recognition very unlikely in the near future. Civilian casualties in Gaza could further fuel anti-Israel sentiment.
- **Israeli-Palestinian relations:** Saudi Arabia and others have normalization with Israel conditional on progress on Palestinian statehood. But members of Israel's right-wing governing coalition adamantly oppose the concessions to Palestinians needed to clinch deals.
- **Domestic opposition:** There is little domestic support among publics in many Arab states for recognition of Israel given hostility toward its policies toward Palestinians.
- **Kuwait and Tunisia unlikely:** Kuwait and Tunisia have taken a harder line against normalization with Israel to bolster domestic legitimacy.


[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	3 months	Number of Forecasters	57	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	24 days	Average for questions in their first 3 months: 47			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	4	Number of Forecasts	154		
		Average for questions in their first 3 months: 96			

Will Russia deliver S-400/S-500 missile systems or Su-35 fighter jets to Iran before 1 Feb 2025?

Crowd Forecast: 9% chance (missiles); 8% chance (jets)



Higher probability forecasts discuss...

- **Arms-for-arms deal:** Russia and Iran have an ongoing military partnership and Russia wants to repay Iran for providing drones and other equipment for use in Ukraine. Providing air defense systems or fighter jets could be part of a larger arms-for-arms deal.
- **Timeframe allows for changes:** The question's long timeframe (over 1 year) allows for changes like an end to the Ukraine war that could enable Russia to export arms.
- **Counters to U.S. influence:** Russia wants to counter U.S. and NATO influence in the Middle East and arming Iran helps serve that goal.
- **Other aircraft delivered:** Russia has already delivered some military aircraft to Iran (Yak-130 trainers) which could indicate eventual delivery of more advanced jets.
- **S-400 less risky:** Providing the S-400 may pose less risk of blowback from Israel and the West than the Su-35 jets.

Lower probability forecasts discuss...

- **Russian military strained:** Russia's military is strained from the Ukraine war and needs to retain stocks of advanced equipment for its own use. Production and exports are hampered by sanctions limiting access to key components.
- **International opposition:** Israel and the West oppose Russia providing these advanced weapons to Iran and could retaliate or apply pressure to stop any deals.
- **Possible collapse of Su-35 deal:** Reports suggest that Iran's deal with Russia for Su-35 jets has fallen through.
- **Maintain regional relations:** Russia wants to maintain decent relations with other Middle Eastern countries who would be threatened by Iran getting advanced arms.


[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	2 months	Number of Forecasters	47	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	24 days	Average for questions in their first 3 months: 47			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	0	Number of Forecasts	108		
		Average for questions in their first 3 months: 96			

Will Ali Khamenei flee Iran or cease to be Supreme Leader before 1 Mar 2024?

Crowd Forecast: 2% chance



Higher probability forecasts discuss...

- **Age and health risks:** His age (84) and past health issues increase the chance he could die or become incapacitated before the deadline. Forecasters cite statistics on mortality rates for men his age.
- **Possible protests and unrest:** There is a small chance of a major uprising or protests that could force him to flee. The protests following Mahsa Amini's death showed widespread discontent, and the case of 16-year old Armita Geravand, who fell into a coma after an alleged confrontation with morality police, could reignite protests if she dies.
- **Possible retaliation from Israel:** Israel may target him in retaliation for Iran's involvement in attacks against Israel.

Lower probability forecasts discuss...

- **Khamenei's Longevity:** He has held the position since the 1980s and shows no sign of stepping down. He recently made public appearances affirming his control.
- **Government suppresses unrest:** The government has suppressed protests and unrest. It maintains tight control over the population.
- **Access to quality healthcare:** While his age poses a risk, his past health scares did not cause him to cede power, and world leaders tend to live longer than average due to healthcare access.
- **Support from Russia and China:** Russia and China continue to support the Iranian regime, reducing external pressure.
- **Less pressure from the U.S.:** The prisoner swap and partial thaw in U.S.-Iran relations reduce the chance of U.S. intervention to depose him.


[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	6 months	Number of Forecasters	77	Participants in this question	better than
Average forecast age	1 month	Average for questions older than 6 months:	55	vs. all forecasters	average ⓘ
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	1	Number of Forecasts	380		
		Average for questions older than 6 months:	183		

Will uranium enriched to 90% or more be discovered in an Iranian facility according to the IAEA by 31 Dec 2024?

Crowd Forecast: 4% chance



Higher probability forecasts discuss...

- **Technical capability:** Iran has already been enriching uranium up to 60% purity for over two years, so they likely have the technical capability to reach 90% enrichment if they choose to do so. Some forecasters point to the recent discovery of uranium particles enriched to 83.7% as evidence that Iran may be moving towards higher levels of enrichment.
- **Motivation:** Iran is highly motivated to develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent against perceived enemies like Israel and Saudi Arabia. The regime may decide the benefits of crossing the 90% enrichment threshold outweigh the risks.
- **Timeframe:** The timeframe for the question (through end of 2024) provides a wide window where Iran could potentially make a dash for higher enrichment.

Lower probability forecasts discuss...

- **International backlash:** Crossing the 90% enrichment threshold would likely trigger strong international backlash, harsher sanctions, and potentially military action against Iran's nuclear facilities. This could jeopardize Iran's economic relations and nuclear negotiations with the West.
- **Incremental strategy:** Iran has historically followed an incremental strategy of pushing enrichment levels higher over time rather than rushing to 90%. They are likely to continue holding at 60% to extract concessions while preserving a breakout capability.
- **Concealment:** Even if Iran enriches to 90%, it would likely do so at secret, potentially undeclared facilities not accessible to IAEA inspectors. Iran probably wouldn't allow 90% enrichment to be discovered unless they wanted it publicly known.
- **Reduced motivation:** Factors like Iran's rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, strengthened ties with Russia and China, and Israel's growing regional isolation may reduce Iran's motivation to take the major provocative step of openly enriching to 90%

in the near future.


[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	3 months	Number of Forecasters	60	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	28 days	Average for questions in their first 3 months: 47			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	1	Number of Forecasts	140		
		Average for questions in their first 3 months: 96			

Will Iran eliminate its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% by 31 Dec 2024?

Crowd Forecast: 0% chance | Most likely outcome: stockpile increases (87% chance)



Higher probability forecasts discuss...

Reasons for stockpile elimination or partial reduction.

- **Nuclear deal:** If a new nuclear deal can be negotiated to replace the JCPOA, Iran may agree to limits or reductions in exchange for sanctions relief. However, this is seen as unlikely in the near-term.
- **Diplomacy:** Iran could make a limited reduction as a goodwill gesture or diplomatic overture, but is unlikely to give up its entire stockpile.
- **Regime change:** A major change in Iran's leadership could recalibrate its nuclear policies, but regime change appears unlikely at present.
- **Reduction by force:** Military strikes by Israel or others could physically degrade some portion of the stockpile. However, this may also provoke Iran to accelerate the program.

Lower probability forecasts discuss...

Reasons for stockpile increase.

- **National pride:** Iran sees its nuclear program and uranium enrichment as a matter of national pride and security. Reducing the stockpile would be seen as capitulation and compromise on a core national interest. There is little domestic political will for concessions.
- **Mistrust of negotiations:** Iran does not trust the West, especially the U.S., when it comes to negotiations over its nuclear program. It sees prior deals like the JCPOA as failed and does not have faith they will be adhered to.
- **Iranian defense:** Iran wants to maintain deterrence and leverage against regional rivals like Israel and Saudi Arabia. The uranium stockpile boosts its military capabilities.
- **Desired nuclear expertise:** Enrichment provides technical expertise and human capital for Iran's nuclear scientists and industry. There are technological benefits in continuing the program.

- **Alignment with Russia and China:** Iran is expanding ties with countries like Russia and China who are less likely to pressure it over nuclear issues. It feels less constrained internationally.


[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	19 days	Number of Forecasters	39	Participants in this question	better than
Average forecast age	11 days	Average for questions in their first 4 weeks: 34		vs. all forecasters	average ⓘ
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	1	Number of Forecasts	51		
		Average for questions in their first 4 weeks: 45			

Will a JCPOA participant country begin the process of imposing “snapback” sanctions on Iran by 31 Dec 2024?

Crowd Forecast: 4% chance



Higher probability forecasts discuss...

- **Concern over highly enriched uranium:** Likelihood of snapback sanctions depends on whether the IAEA uncovers weapons-grade uranium, or Iran commits other violations of the JCPOA terms.
- **EU/UK as potential initiators:** The EU and UK are the most likely initiators of the snapback process, despite it not being their preferred diplomatic move.

Lower probability forecasts discuss...

- **U.S. influence:** The Biden administration prefers negotiation and encouraging Iran's JCPOA compliance rather than force like Trump.
- **Western priorities elsewhere:** European countries are focused on other issues like Ukraine and don't want to escalate tensions. They see keeping the threat of snapback as more useful than actual sanctions.
- **China and Russia's reluctance:** China and Russia are unlikely to impose sanctions on Iran, given their alignment with Iran's interests.
- **Iran in BRICS:** Iran joining BRICS reduces the likelihood of allies sanctioning them and may provide alternatives.
- **Counterproductive:** Sanctions are seen by forecasters as counterproductive and could motivate Iran to accelerate nuclear program with little ability for sanctions to compel reversal.


[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	3 months	Number of Forecasters	37	Participants in this question	better than
Average forecast age	26 days	Average for questions in their first 3 months:	47	vs. all forecasters	average ⓘ
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	0	Number of Forecasts	80		
		Average for questions in their first 3 months:	96		

Will Iran announce it will leave the JCPOA before 1 Jan 2025?

Crowd Forecast: 17% chance



Higher probability forecasts discuss...

- **Iran's nuclear goals:** Iran wants to pursue building nuclear weapons, and leaving the deal would allow them to be more open about this goal. There are lessons from history like Gaddafi losing power after giving up nuclear ambitions that could motivate this.
- **Symbolic move of independence:** Leaving could be a symbolic move to assert Iran's independence and defend its interests if it feels pressure from sanctions or isolation. It could be an escalatory action in ongoing tensions.
- **Futility of current deal:** If relations with the U.S. break down and prospects for a revised deal are gone, Iran may see no reason to keep up the pretense that the deal still has meaning.

Lower probability forecasts discuss...

- **Economic benefit to staying:** Iran benefits from sanctions relief and economic incentives by staying in the deal. Exiting would invite more economic punishment.
- **Preserving legitimacy:** Staying in the deal allows Iran to portray itself as committed to agreements and not pursuing nuclear weapons. Leaving would damage its legitimacy.
- **Avoiding diplomatic isolation:** Russia, China and some European nations support the deal, so leaving would isolate Iran diplomatically.
- **Discreetly advancing nuclear goals:** Iran can continue nuclear enrichment while technically staying in the deal, so there is no need to formally withdraw.
- **Keeping future options open:** Iran hopes to negotiate an improved deal in the future, so wants to keep that option open by remaining in the JCPOA.


[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	2 months	Number of Forecasters	57	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	21 days	Average for questions in their first 3 months: 47			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	1	Number of Forecasts	104		
		Average for questions in their first 3 months: 96			

Will Iran agree to limit uranium enrichment to 5% or less in the next six months?

Crowd Forecast: 1% chance



Higher probability forecasts discuss...

- **Diplomacy and negotiations:** A small possibility of international intervention or pressure from other countries like China to de-escalate regional tensions.
- **Iranian regime change:** An extremely slim chance of dramatic regime change or internal revolution leading to moderated nuclear policy.

Lower probability forecasts discuss...

- **National pride:** The nuclear program is a major source of national pride and gives Iran leverage in negotiations. They're unlikely to voluntarily limit it without substantial concessions from other parties.
- **Lack of incentives:** There is currently little incentive for Iran to agree to restrictions, as sanctions relief seems unlikely in the near term. The 2015 JCPOA has collapsed and there are no active negotiations underway. Restarting substantive talks and reaching a new agreement will likely take more than 6 months.
- **Alignment with Russia:** Iran's growing alignment with Russia, including their supply of drones/weapons to Russia in the Ukraine War, signals decreasing reliance on the West.
- **Internal political climate:** Iran's crackdown on internal dissent and open defiance of sanctions and indifference to pressure from the U.S. and NATO underscores they are willing to pursue nuclear capabilities regardless.
- **Historical pursuit of enrichment:** Iran has

been working steadily toward higher enrichment levels (60%) for years, so suddenly limiting to 5% makes little sense absent dramatic external intervention.

- **Lack of trust:** The lack of trust between Iran and Western countries, particularly the US, adds to the skepticism that Iran would agree to any limitations.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	19 days	Number of Forecasters	46	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	12 days	Average for questions in their first 4 weeks: 34			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	3	Number of Forecasts	58		
		Average for questions in their first 4 weeks: 45			

B. Impact Assessment of Individual Signals

The following table shows INFER's assessment of how each forecast signal **advances**, **mitigates**, or **maintains** status quo conditions on the likelihood of Iran developing a nuclear weapon.

Impact of signals on broader issue: Will Iran develop a nuclear weapon?

Driver	Signal / Forecast Question	Possible Answer	Impact to Issue Outcome
External Threat Environment	Will any listed Muslim-majority country sign an agreement establishing or normalizing diplomatic relations with Israel by 31 December 2023?	Yes	Advances
		No	Maintains status quo
	Will any of the following countries recognize Israel's statehood by 31 December 2024?	Kuwait	Advances
		Oman	Advances
		Qatar	Advances
		Saudi Arabia	Advances
		Tunisia	Advances
	Will Russia deliver the below weapons systems to Iran before 1 February 2025?	S-400 or S-500 missile system	Advances
		Su-35 fighter jets	Advances
	Will there be an attack on an Iranian nuclear- or missile-related facility in the next 6 months?	Yes	May advance or mitigate
		No	May maintain status quo or mitigate
Internal Preferences in Iran	Will Ali Khamenei flee Iran or cease to be Supreme Leader before 1 March 2024?	Yes	May advance or mitigate
	By 31 December 2024, will	Yes	Advances

	uranium enriched to 90% or more be discovered in an Iranian facility, according to the IAEA?	No	Maintains status quo
	Will Iran eliminate its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% by 31 December 2024, according to the IAEA?	Yes, the stockpile will be reduced by 100% to 0 kg	Mitigates
		No, the stockpile will be reduced by 50% or more (>0 kg - 61.8 kg)	Mitigates
		No, the stockpile will be reduced by less than 50% or stay the same (>61.8 kg - 123.6 kg)	Maintains status quo
		No, the stockpile will increase (>123.6 kg)	Advances
International Incentives and Disincentives for Nuclear Development	Will a JCPOA participant country begin the process of imposing “snapback” sanctions on Iran by 31 December 2024?	Yes	Advances
		No	Maintains status quo
	Before 1 January 2025, will Iran announce that it will leave the JCPOA ("Iran nuclear deal")?	Yes	Advances
		No	Maintains status quo
	Will Iran agree to limit uranium enrichment to 5% or less in the next 6 months?	Yes	Mitigates

C. The Forecasters

The forecasters who have participated thus far in these questions have the following profile:

- 175 forecasters made 1,693 total forecasts
- 72% of forecasts were made by “INFER Pros” - participants in INFER’s Pro Forecaster Program, who were selected based on their accuracy track record of at least 1 year on INFER or other similar forecasting sites or programs.

Demographics

Country	% of Forecasters
USA	45%
Canada, UK, Australia, New Zealand	7%
Europe (not UK)	19%
Latin America, Caribbean	17%
Asia	11%
Africa	1%

D. Methodology for Rationale Summaries

Rationales of INFER forecasters have been selected and summarized by Claude, an AI assistant tool created by Anthropic. To build the rationale summaries presented in this report, we provided forecasts (probabilities and narrative rationales) to Claude to summarize into bulleted lists of arguments. We then manually edited the bulleted summaries for accuracy and readability to ensure that each list item accurately represented forecasters' rationales and was assigned to the proper list.

[Interested in an issue decomposition on another topic? >>](#)