

September 2023 Update

This is a snapshot update of the forecast trend data on INFER as of 30 September 2023.




East Asia & Pacific Region - pg. 1 | Europe and Eurasia Region - pg. 2 | Near East (Middle East & North Africa) Region - pg. 3

Will Myanmar hold national elections on or before 31 December 2023?

1% chance

↓ **Down 4% from 8/18/23**
Based on 411 forecasts




[See detailed forecast rationales](#) • [See consensus trend and crowd profile](#)

Will the Global Protest Tracker record a significant antigovernment protest involving 10,000 or more participants in Thailand between April 2023 and April 2024?

6% chance

↓ **Down 24% since 8/18/23**
Based on 197 forecasts




[See detailed forecast rationales](#) • [See consensus trend and crowd profile](#)

Will Imran Khan be re-elected as prime minister following Pakistan's upcoming general election?

2% chance

↓ **Down 1% from 8/18/23**
Based on 208 forecasts



[See detailed forecast rationales](#) • [See consensus trend and crowd profile](#)

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This is a snapshot update of the forecast trend data on INFER as of 30 September 2023.




East Asia & Pacific Region - pg. 1 | **Europe and Eurasia Region - pg. 2** | Near East (Middle East & North Africa) Region - pg. 3
South & Central Asia Region

Will Vladimir Putin cease to be the president of the Russian Federation before 1 May 2024?


6% chance

↓ **Down 2% from 8/18/23**
Based on 523 forecasts



[See detailed forecast rationales](#) • [See consensus trend and crowd profile](#)

What percentage of Ukrainian territory will be held by Russia in December 2023?




Based on 195 forecasts

[See detailed forecast rationales](#) • [See consensus trend and crowd profile](#) • [Read blog post comparing forecaster and expert perspectives](#)

Will Ali Khamenei flee Iran or cease to be Supreme Leader before 1 March 2024?

2% chance

Down 1% from 8/18/23
Based on 246 forecasts




[See detailed forecast rationales](#) • [See consensus trend and crowd profile](#)

Will any listed Muslim-majority country sign an agreement establishing or normalizing diplomatic relations with Israel by 31 December 2023?

9% chance

Down 12% from 8/18/23
Based on 318 forecasts




[See detailed forecast rationales](#) • [See consensus trend and crowd profile](#)

Will Israel and Sudan sign an agreement normalizing diplomatic relations by 31 December 2023?

5% chance

Up 2% from 8/18/23
Based on 436 forecasts




[See detailed forecast rationales](#) • [See consensus trend and crowd profile](#)

Will the Lebanese parliament elect a president by 31 December 2023?

11% chance

Down 25% from 8/18/23
Based on 177 forecasts



[See detailed forecast rationales](#) • [See consensus trend and crowd profile](#)

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A. Rationale Summaries By Forecast Question

This section presents a high-level summary of forecasters' rationales for each question in the report, along with the crowd forecast and change in consensus since the last report (in parentheses). Rationales can be found in full by clicking “See detailed forecast rationales”, and a list of sources linked within rationales can be found by clicking “See source links”. The data in this report is from 15 August through 30 September 2023.

Will Myanmar hold national elections on or before 31 December 2023?

Crowd Forecast: 1% chance (+4%) | [See detailed forecast rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Previous Statements of Intention: The junta previously stated an intention to hold elections in August 2023. Although this deadline has passed, they may still follow through on holding the election before the end of the year. • Appearance of Legitimacy: Holding elections, even if flawed, could give the appearance of legitimacy and lessen international pressures. The junta may see value in holding symbolic elections for these reasons. • Potential for Partial or Regional Elections: Violence and instability may be localized enough to allow elections in some areas. Partial or regional elections may take place before the end of the year. • Suppression Prior to Elections: The junta could take aggressive steps to suppress opposition and resistance prior to the election, clearing the way for it to proceed. • Opposition Participation: If the junta decides to hold an election, some minor political parties could decide to participate, despite the opposition from major groups like the National Unity Government. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prolonged State of Emergency: The military junta has extended the state of emergency through the end of 2023, which signals they do not intend to relinquish power in the near term. Holding elections would mean ending the state of emergency. • Official Statements: Senior members of military-backed parties have said elections will likely be in 2025, not 2023. This suggests the junta is sticking to its own timeline, not external pressure. • No Signs of Election Preparation: There are no visible signs of preparation for elections despite limited time remaining in 2023 to organize national polls. It seems implausible that elections could be held with less than four months remaining. • Pushback by Opposition: Opposition groups like the National Unity Government are boycotting elections, undermining their legitimacy. There has also been violence targeting election officials. • No Incentive to Hold Elections: In general, military juntas are reluctant to risk losing power through elections. The crowd sees very little chance of the junta voluntarily holding competitive elections that could remove them from power.

Will the Global Protest Tracker record a significant anti-government protest involving 10,000 or more participants in Thailand between April 2023 and April 2024?

Crowd Forecast: 6% chance (+24%) | [See detailed forecast rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Blockage of Move Forward Party: The Move Forward Party won the most seats in the election but was blocked from forming a government by conservative lawmakers, going against the will of voters. This could spark protests from their supporters. • Military Alignment: The Pheu Thai party formed a governing coalition with military-aligned parties despite campaigning against military involvement in politics. This deal could anger voters. • Continued Military and Monarchical Influence: There are still unresolved issues around amending the constitution to reduce military influence and reforming the monarchy's role in politics. Continued military influence despite election results could catalyze protests. • Imprisonment of Thaksin Shinawatra: The return and subsequent imprisonment of exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra could catalyze protests. As the de facto leader of Pheu Thai, his imprisonment could mobilize supporters. • Military Overreach: If the military tries to maintain power when their Senate voting privileges expire in 2024, it could provoke large protests from pro-democracy groups. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Protests Despite Undemocratic Blockage: No major protests materialized since Move Forward was blocked from forming a government, suggesting limited appetite for protest at the moment. • Leaders Focused on Future Elections: Move Forward and Pheu Thai seem focused on preparing for future elections rather than fueling unrest. • No Major Trigger: Without a major trigger, the population seems placated for now compared to previous mass protests. Polls show low approval but also resignation rather than outrage. • Placating Populist Policies: The new Pheu Thai-led government may be able to satisfy enough people through populist policies to avoid provoking massive protests, at least in the short-term.

Will Imran Khan be re-elected as prime minister following Pakistan's upcoming general election?

Crowd Forecast: 2% chance (↓1%) | [See detailed forecast rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sympathetic Supreme Court: The judiciary could potentially reverse Khan's ineligibility to run if the Supreme Court intervenes on his behalf. The Supreme Court is seen as sympathetic to Khan. • Grassroots Support: As a populist leader, Khan retains significant grassroots support. If allowed to run, he could potentially mobilize this. • Possible Election Delays: There is speculation that elections will be delayed until 2024, which could give Khan time to appeal the decision rendering him ineligible to run. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Khan's Ineligibility: Khan has been convicted on corruption charges and sentenced to five years in jail, which bars him from holding public office during that time. This makes him ineligible to run in the upcoming election. • Multiple Proceedings: Over 200 legal proceedings against Khan have been filed since his ouster, which will likely keep him tangled up in the court system for years, preventing his political return. • Out of Favor with Electorate: Khan has fallen significantly in opinion polls and surveys of the Pakistani electorate. It appears he would be unlikely to win even if he did manage to participate. • Establishment Opposed to Khan: The Pakistani military and political establishment seems stacked against Khan currently and will likely continue working to prevent his return to power through additional legal proceedings.

Will Vladimir Putin cease to be the president of the Russian Federation before 1 May 2024?

Crowd Forecast: 6% chance (+2%) | [See detailed forecast rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Putin's Age: Putin is currently 70 years old. Forecasters see the potential for health issues or even death to lead to him stepping down or being removed from power in the next eight months. • Dissatisfaction Among Elites: There are signs of growing dissatisfaction and criticism of Putin's leadership within Russian elite and nationalist circles due to failures in the war in Ukraine. This could eventually lead to moves to oust Putin, either through an internal coup or forcing him to resign. • Wagner Group-Putin Dispute: The recent public dispute between Putin and Wagner group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin showed potential cracks in Putin's inner circle. There is speculation that Prigozhin may have been plotting against Putin. His reported death in a plane crash could demoralize Russian troops loyal to Wagner. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidated Power: Putin has firmly consolidated power over 20+ years as leader and shown a willingness to act ruthlessly against challenges, as seen with the elimination of Prigozhin. Forecasters believe the death of Prigozhin is one of many successful attempts by Putin to sideline his opponents. • No Clear Successors: There are currently no organized opposition groups or leaders positioned to challenge Putin. Russian elites may be dissatisfied but are unlikely to directly oppose him. • War in Ukraine: Forecasts suggest the chances of decisive Ukrainian military victories in the next eight months are low. The war appears headed toward a stalemate, which is unlikely to threaten Putin's power. • Public Support: The Russian public still largely supports Putin due to pervasive propaganda and his image as a strong leader, though extended economic troubles could weaken this support over time. • Constitutional Changes: Putin recently pushed through constitutional changes allowing him to stay in power until 2036. He is likely to win the upcoming 2024 election given his dominance of politics and media in Russia.

What percentage of Ukrainian territory will be held by Russia in December 2023?

Crowd Forecast most likely outcome: 50% chance of Russia holding 17-22% of Ukraine (+25%)

[See detailed forecast rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Forecasts anticipating more Russian control discuss...	Forecasts anticipating less Russian control discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Favorable Geography: Russia continues to make incremental gains in the Donbas region despite Ukrainian counter offensives elsewhere. The geography favors Russia, as it consolidates gains and inches further into Ukrainian territory. • Impending Winter: Russia may intensify attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure as winter sets in, weakening Ukraine's ability to defend its territory. Cold weather favors Russia. • Artillery Advantage: Russia still has a significant advantage in artillery and can continue a war of attrition even if they lack manpower. They may be able to capture more cities through sheer bombardment. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Western Military Aid: Western military aid to Ukraine is increasing and allowing them to go into the offensive with advanced weapons. • Energy Grid Attacks Backfiring: Russia's attacks on energy infrastructure could backfire by further uniting Western support for Ukraine. • Ukrainian Resolve: Ukrainian morale and will to fight remains high while Russia faces discontentment about the war. Russia may lack the resolve to capture and hold more ground. • Lack of Organization: Russia has struggled to occupy captured territory due to partisan attacks and overstretched supply lines. Expanding occupied areas creates more problems. • Lack of Manpower: Russia's troop mobilization has been chaotic and unlikely to provide enough well-trained soldiers to hold more ground.
<p>Read detailed perspectives in the blog post “INFER forecasters weigh Ukraine’s counteroffensive”.</p>	

Will Ali Khamenei flee Iran or cease to be Supreme Leader before 1 March 2024?

Crowd Forecast: 2% chance (+1%) | [See detailed forecast rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Khamenei's Age: Khamenei is 84 years old, so deteriorating health or death from natural causes in the next six months is a real possibility. • Serious Health Issues: There are some rumors that Khamenei has serious health issues like prostate cancer, though specifics are unclear. If true, his health could force him to step down. • Ongoing Protests and Unrest: Ongoing protests and civil unrest in Iran over issues like women's rights put pressure on the regime. Though they have simmered down recently, a resurgence could threaten Khamenei's position. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unsubstantiated Rumors: Khamenei appears relatively healthy and active in recent public appearances. There are no definitive signs he is seriously ill, despite rumors claiming otherwise. • Khamenei's Longevity: Khamenei has weathered challenges to his leadership before, and has been Supreme Leader for over 30 years. Stepping down voluntarily seems unlikely. • Lack of Serious Opposition: The regime has so far successfully suppressed protests without making major concessions. There also appears to be a lack of serious international support for a regime change. • Few Recent Protests: Time has passed since initial protests, with no new major threats emerging. Barring an unpredictable event, Khamenei's position looks stable.

Will any listed Muslim-majority country* sign an agreement establishing or normalizing diplomatic relations with Israel by 31 December 2023?

**The listed Muslim-majority countries are Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Brunei, Comoros, Djibouti, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Niger, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.*

Crowd Forecast: 8% chance (↓5%) | [See detailed forecast rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Saudi Arabia Taking Steps Toward Normalization: Saudi Arabia seems to be moving towards normalization, with some reports of preliminary agreements being negotiated with U.S. mediation. Saudi Arabia's crown prince has even hinted at openness to establishing ties with Israel, while Netanyahu claimed progress on a Saudi deal in a recent UN speech. • Previous Agreements: Israel's previous normalization agreements with UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco in 2020 (the "Abraham Accords") showed a willingness by some Muslim countries to establish ties. Israel's new right-wing government is still interested in normalization as a foreign policy achievement. • U.S. Support: The U.S. is actively pushing for a "grand bargain" between Israel and Saudi Arabia, indicating that there is support for Arab-Israeli normalization in Washington. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Israeli Treatment of Palestinians: Many forecasters argue Muslim countries will want to see improvement in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship before normalizing relations with Israel. • Public Backlash: When Israel's foreign minister Eli Cohen revealed that he had held an unprecedented meeting with his Libyan counterpart Najla Mangoush, it sparked outrage in Libya. The Libyan foreign minister was fired and fled the country over the backlash. • Countries Waiting on Saudi-Israeli Normalization: Saudi Arabia is seen as key, and normalization by the end of 2023 seems unlikely. Other countries may wait for Saudi normalization before making moves themselves.

Will Israel and Sudan sign an agreement normalizing diplomatic relations by 31 December 2023?

Crowd Forecast: 5% chance (↑2%) | [See detailed forecast rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Israel's Previous Agreements with other Arab states: Israel has made recent efforts to normalize relations with Arab states, as evidenced by the Abraham Accords with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco in 2020. • Sudan's Struggling Economy: Poor economic conditions and the need for humanitarian aid in Sudan create incentives for normalizing relations with Israel. Israel may seek to capitalize on Sudan's economic needs to advance normalization. • Covert Israeli Operations: Israel may conduct covert operations to push normalization efforts forward in spite of its current political instability under Netanyahu's controversial new government. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sudan's Civil War: Sudan is embroiled in civil war between the military and rebel forces. The conflict has intensified, with repeated ceasefire breaches. This instability makes formal normalization unlikely in the near term. • Sudan's Domestic Troubles: Sudan's economy has struggled from the impacts of COVID-19, macroeconomic imbalances, and structural deficiencies. At this time, addressing economic and humanitarian needs is seen as more important than normalization. • Public Opposition: There is strong public opposition to normalization, with over 70% of Sudanese stating they are against Israeli ties in opinion polls. • Israel's Political Instability: Israel is experiencing its own political instability with Netanyahu's controversial new government, which may limit its ability to finalize further normalization deals abroad.

Will the Lebanese parliament elect a president by 31 December 2023?

Crowd Forecast: 15% chance (+21%) | [See detailed forecast rationales](#) | [See source links](#)


Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Closer to Consensus: The 12th election session in June showed some signs of increased consensus compared to previous failed attempts. This suggests parties may be moving closer to an agreement. • Foreign Involvement: Foreign countries like France have expressed optimism about potential openings and progress in resolving the deadlock, and Qatar's foreign minister will visit Lebanon in October. Their involvement could help facilitate a compromise. • Internal Pressure: There is mounting public pressure on major players like Hezbollah and Iran to elect a president and address the severe economic crisis in Lebanon. This could motivate concessions needed to reach a deal. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Numerous Failed Attempts: After twelve failed attempts and nearly a year of stalemate, there is still no clear path to the inter-party agreement needed for a candidate to get 65+ votes. • Decreasing Number of Elections: Parliamentary elections have steadily declined in frequency, suggesting less urgency and momentum toward resolution before year's end. • Obstructions by Hezbollah: Political groups like Hezbollah see benefit in the status quo and actively obstruct the election process through walk-outs, boycotts, and other means for delay. • Humanitarian Crises: Lebanon faces mounting crises—economic, refugee, food shortages, etc. The environment of instability reduces prospects of the factions compromising. • Passage of time: Time is running out, with only three months left before the end of the year and no agreement in sight. The complex political dynamics make quick resolution unlikely.

B. Resolved Questions

This section presents the forecast questions that have been resolved in July. A question is “resolved” when the outcome is known and forecasts can be judged for accuracy.


Will Kosovo and Serbia sign an EU-backed proposal aimed at normalizing diplomatic relations by 30 June 2023?

Final Crowd Forecast: Yes - 0% chance; No - 100% chance | **Correct Answer:** No




Will Sweden become a full member of NATO before the NATO Summit in July 2023?

Final Crowd Forecast: Yes - 3% chance; No - 97% chance | **Correct Answer:** No




Will the composition of Israel's current governing coalition change before 1 July 2023?

Final Crowd Forecast: Yes - 0% chance; No - 100% chance | **Correct Answer:** No




Will Prayut Chan-o-cha be re-elected as prime minister of Thailand by the Thai parliament after the next election and before 1 Jan 2024?

Final Crowd Forecast: Yes - 0% chance; No - 100% chance | **Correct Answer:** No




Will the Pheu Thai Party be part of a governing coalition in Thailand after the next election and before 1 Jan 2024?

Final Crowd Forecast: Yes - 95% chance; No - 5% chance | **Correct Answer:** Yes




Will Egypt's urban inflation rate be greater than or equal to 40% for any month between March and August 2023, inclusive?

Final Crowd Forecast: Yes - 1% chance; No - 99% chance | **Correct Answer:** No



Will the value of 1 US Dollar equal or exceed 800,000 Iranian Rial on the open market (or 80,000 Toman, as reported on Bonbast) before 1 September 2023?

Final Crowd Forecast: Yes - 0% chance; No - 100% chance | **Correct Answer:** No



C. The Forecasters

The forecasters who have participated thus far in these questions have the following profile:

- 291 total forecasters
- 28% are “INFER Pros” - participants in INFER’s Pro Forecaster Program, who were selected based on their accuracy track record of at least 1 year on INFER or other similar forecasting sites or programs.

Demographics

Country	Ratio
USA	40%
Canada, UK, Australia, New Zealand	5%
Europe	28%
Latin America, Caribbean	16%
Asia	9%
Africa	1%

D. Report Methodology

Rationales of INFER forecasters have been selected and summarized by Claude, an AI assistant tool created by Anthropic. To build the rationale summaries presented in this report, we provided forecasts (probabilities and narrative rationales) to Claude to summarize into bulleted lists of arguments. We then manually edited the bulleted summaries for accuracy and readability to ensure that each list item accurately represented forecasters' rationales and was assigned to the proper list.

Each question in the report also includes links to the crowd forecasts, rationales, and source links used by forecasters.