

INFER Issue Report

Iran's Progress Towards a Nuclear Weapon

March 2024

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Iran’s Progress Towards a Nuclear Weapon

Iran has been steadily building its nuclear weapons capability since 2019, when it first began ignoring limitations set under the JCPOA. This heatmap analyzes crowd forecasts from the signals below to show whether INFER’s forecasts indicate that momentum towards Iran building a nuclear weapon is increasing, decreasing, or staying the same across various indicators.

Decreasing Momentum	Status Quo	Increasing Momentum
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Drivers	Signals		INFER Probability Forecast		
			31 Jan	29 Feb	31 Mar
Attacks on Nuclear or Military Facilities	Attack on an Iranian nuclear or missile facility in the next six months		13%	12%	7%
Coordination Between Iran’s Enemies and Competitors	Muslim-majority country normalizes relations with Israel in the next six months		1%	1%	1%
	Middle Eastern or North African country recognizes Israel’s statehood by 31 Dec 2024	Saudi Arabia	5%	6%	5%
		Oman	3%	3%	2%
		Qatar	2%	2%	2%
		Kuwait	2%	2%	2%
		Tunisia	2%	2%	1%
Military Support from Russia and China	Russia delivers missile systems or fighter jets to Iran before 1 Feb 2025	Su-35	15%	14%	12%
		S-400 or S-500	8%	8%	7%
Leadership Changes	[RESOLVED 1 MAR] Ali Khamenei flees Iran or ceases to be Supreme Leader before 1 Mar 2024		1%	DID NOT OCCUR <small>FINAL FORECAST: 0%</small>	—
	Ali Khamenei flees Iran or ceases to be Supreme Leader in the next year		—	—	7%
Nuclear Development	IAEA discovers uranium enriched to 90% or more in Iran by 31 Dec 2024		6%	6%	4%
	Iran eliminates, reduces, or grows its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% by 31 Dec 2024*	Eliminates	0%	0%	0%
		Reduces by 50%+	1%	0%	1%
		Reduces by less than 50% or stays the same	3%	5%	5%
		Increases	96%	94%	94%
International Agreements and Sanctions	JCPOA participant country begins the process of imposing “snapback” sanctions on Iran by 31 Dec 2024		3%	3%	3%
	Iran announces it will leave the JCPOA before 1 Jan 2025		5%	5%	5%
	Iran agrees to limit uranium enrichment to 5% or less in next six months		1%	1%	0%
Regional Conflict	Iran goes to war with another country in the next year		12%	3%	3%

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A. Forecast Trend Charts and Rationale Summaries

Will there be an attack on an Iranian nuclear- or missile-related facility in the next six months?


Crowd Forecast: 7% chance

AI Summarization of Rationales: Although tensions are high, there are powerful constraints on key actors that make a direct attack on an Iranian facility unlikely in the next six months.

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existential Threat to Israel: Israel views Iran's nuclear program as an existential threat and has attacked Iranian facilities in the past. • Tensions Due to Israel-Hamas War: Tensions are high between Iran, Israel, and the U.S. due to the Israel-Hamas war and Iran's support of proxies attacking U.S. and Israeli forces. • U.S. Domestic Pressure: Republicans in the U.S. are pushing for more aggressive action against Iran. • Progress in Iran's Nuclear Program: Iran may be further along in its nuclear program than publicly known, raising proliferation concerns. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S. Focus Elsewhere: The U.S. is focused on the Russia-Ukraine war and wants to avoid additional conflicts. • Israel's Focus on Gaza: Israel is preoccupied with the situation in Gaza. • U.S. Elections: Biden faces domestic political constraints in an election year. • Limited Iranian Aggression: Iran has been exercising some restraint in the Israel-Hamas war and has exchanged messages with the U.S. • Potential for Escalation: Attacking facilities could lead to dangerous escalation in the region.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Consensus Trend



Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	8 months	Number of Forecasters	105	Participants in this question	better than
Average forecast age	2 months	Average for questions older than 6 months: 58		vs. all forecasters	average 1
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	6	Number of Forecasts	538		
		Average for questions older than 6 months: 205			

Will any Muslim-majority country sign an agreement establishing or normalizing diplomatic relations with Israel in the next six months?


Crowd Forecast: 1% chance

AI Summarization of Rationales: Overall, normalization in the next six months seems very unlikely given the absence of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, anger in the Muslim world over the situation in Gaza, and Netanyahu's resistance to compromise. However, forecasters note there is a small chance of a breakthrough with Saudi Arabia.

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Previous Saudi Efforts: Saudi Arabia was close to normalization before and could still see benefits from cooperating with Israel against mutual enemies like Iran. However, this is unlikely in the next six months. • Possible Israeli Leadership Change: If Netanyahu leaves office and a more moderate Israeli government emerges, normalization chances could improve. • Possibility of a Grand Bargain: Some see chances for a grand bargain where normalization happens in exchange for concessions like recognizing a Palestinian state. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Muslim Support for Palestinians: The escalation of the Israel-Hamas conflict has set back normalization efforts with the Muslim world, as many Muslim countries see normalization right now as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. • Need for a Cooling Period: Israel's actions in Gaza have sparked widespread anger in the Muslim world, and a ceasefire is unlikely in the near future. Even if fighting stopped, emotions would need months or more to cool before normalization could happen. • Netanyahu Unlikely to Compromise: Netanyahu's far-right government is unwilling to make concessions for peace that could enable normalization, such as a Palestinian state. His focus is on staying in power.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Crowd Consensus



Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	3 months	Number of Forecasters	61	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	20 days	Average for questions in their first 6 months: 55			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	8	Number of Forecasts	173		
		Average for questions in their first 6 months: 155			

Will a listed Middle Eastern / North African country recognize Israel's statehood by 31 Dec 2024?

Crowd Forecast: 5% chance (Saudi Arabia)


AI Summarization of Rationales: The arguments show recognition of Israel's statehood in the near future is very unlikely for Kuwait, Qatar, and Tunisia, with only minimal evidence in favor. For Oman and Saudi Arabia, there are stronger arguments both for and against recognition, but recent violence has created major roadblocks for both. Overall the forecasts suggest recognition is improbable before December 2024 for any of the listed countries.

Main arguments regarding whether each country may recognize Israel's statehood by 31 December 2024

- **Kuwait:** Kuwait has firmly stated it will not recognize Israel without an independent Palestinian state first. However, they have engaged in some dialogue with Israel on regional security issues like Iran's nuclear program, indicating potential openness to recognizing Israel's statehood. This is more likely if Saudi Arabia chooses to recognize Israel first or alongside Kuwait.
- **Oman:** Oman has had some positive engagements with Israel, like allowing Israeli flights in its airspace, and they may follow Saudi Arabia's lead in recognizing Israel. However, Oman said it won't recognize Israel without Palestinian statehood.
- **Qatar:** Qatar has mediated Israel-Hamas negotiations and may see economic benefits in recognizing Israel's statehood. However, Qatar is an ally of Iran and Hamas, and ended trade relations with Israel in 2009 over Israel's actions in Gaza. Recognition is unlikely while the Israel-Hamas war persists.
- **Saudi Arabia:** Saudi Arabia was in talks to recognize Israel before the war in Gaza began, as Saudi Arabia and Israel share economic interests and improved relations could counter Iran. However, Saudi Arabia faces significant domestic opposition to recognizing Israel, and significant progress on Palestinian issues will need to be made before recognition can occur.
- **Tunisia:** Tunisia is unlikely to recognize Israel as it is firmly pro-Palestinian and has proposed a bill criminalizing normalizing ties with Israel.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Consensus Trend



Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	9 months	Number of Forecasters	85	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	2 months	Average for questions older than 6 months: 58			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	5	Number of Forecasts	500		
		Average for questions older than 6 months: 205			

Will Russia deliver S-400/S-500 missile systems or Su-35 fighter jets to Iran before 1 Feb 2025?


Crowd Forecast: 7% chance (missiles); 12% chance (jets)

AI Summarization of Rationales: Current forecasts suggest that major deliveries of S-400/S-500 missiles or Su-35 jets from Russia to Iran are unlikely within the next year, primarily due to Russia's military needs amid its invasion of Ukraine. However, some limited deliveries are possible.

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<p><i>Reasons Russia may deliver S-400/S-500 missile systems to Iran:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening Russia-Iran Relationship: Russia has delivered S-300 missiles to Iran in the past, so military cooperation has precedent. Selling air defense systems to Iran would strengthen the Russia-Iran alliance and allow Russia to counter U.S./NATO influence in the Middle East. • Israel Possibly Unable to Stop Deal: Israel's opposition may not prevent the deal, and Russia could use it to take a stance in the Israel-Iran conflict. 	<p><i>Reasons Russia may not deliver S-400/S-500 missile systems to Iran:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of Inventory: Russia is behind on delivering contracted S-400 systems to India and needs them for its own defense, especially to counter attacks by Ukrainian drones. Russia likely doesn't have inventory to spare for Iran in the near future. • Possible Israeli Backlash: Providing advanced missiles to Iran risks backlash from Israel and escalating tensions, which Russia wants to avoid while fighting in Ukraine. • Losses in War with Ukraine: Russia has lost some S-400 systems in Ukraine and needs to devote its production internally rather than to exports.
<p><i>Reasons Russia may deliver Su-35 fighter jets to Iran:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Finalized Deals Announced: Russia and Iran have announced finalized deals, suggesting delivery is likely. Planes may have already been built for another buyer like Egypt. • Benefits to Limited Deliveries: Some deliveries would show goodwill and strengthen relations, while not hugely impacting Russia's forces. Iran's air defenses need updating. 	<p><i>Reasons Russia may not deliver Su-35 fighter jets to Iran:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Losses in War with Ukraine: Russia is losing Su-35 jets in Ukraine faster than they can be built. They need to devote production internally, especially with Ukraine getting F-16s. • Logistical Challenges: Advanced jets are logistically challenging to transfer and would take time to integrate. • Past Deals Falling Through: Russia has failed to deliver other weapons on time and may not follow through on announced deals.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Consensus Trend



Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	8 months	Number of Forecasters	72	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	2 months	Average for questions older than 6 months: 58			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	3	Number of Forecasts	422		
		Average for questions older than 6 months: 205			

Will Ali Khamenei flee Iran or cease to be Supreme Leader in the next year?


Crowd Forecast: 7% chance

AI Summarization of Rationales: While Khamenei's advanced age suggests some risk, the regime and his health currently appear stable, making major disruption in the next year seem unlikely based on the forecasts.

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Khamenei's Advanced Age: Khamenei is 84 years old and could die of natural causes or illness. Some forecasts cite past health issues like cancer as increasing this risk. • Possibility of Political Upheaval: There is a small chance of political change like protests, unrest, or a coup leading to his removal. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Khamenei's Good Health: Khamenei appears relatively healthy in recent public appearances, suggesting no immediate health crisis. • Iran's Stability: The regime currently seems stable and in firm control, making major disruption unlikely. Recent elections confirmed the hardliners' power. • Regime Change Unlikely: Factors like an improving economy and lack of foreign threats reduce odds of regime change.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Consensus Trend



Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	17 days	Number of Forecasters	47	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	7 days	Average for questions in their first 4 weeks: 34			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	7	Number of Forecasts	55		
		Average for questions in their first 4 weeks: 46			

Will uranium enriched to 90% or more be discovered in an Iranian facility according to the IAEA by 31 Dec 2024?


Crowd Forecast: 4% chance

AI Summarization of Rationales: The arguments center around Iran's technical capability versus the costs of discovery and how likely they are to deliberately or accidentally allow highly enriched uranium to be found. Most forecasts indicate Iran would avoid open discovery.

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat Deterrence: Iran has the technical capability to enrich uranium to 90% and may want nuclear weapons to deter threats from Israel and Saudi Arabia. • Highly-Enriched Uranium: Traces of uranium enriched up to 83.7% have already been found, so detection of 90% is plausible. • Intentional Reveal Possible: Iran could deliberately allow discovery to threaten or negotiate. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fear of Sanctions: Discovery would provoke harsh international sanctions that Iran wants to avoid. • Restricted Monitoring: Iran is restricting IAEA inspector access, making discovery very unlikely. • Iran Likely to Hide Uranium: Iran would likely try to secretly enrich uranium and not let it be discovered.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Consensus Trend



Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	8 months	Number of Forecasters	85	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	2 months	Average for questions older than 6 months: 58			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	7	Number of Forecasts	488		
		Average for questions older than 6 months: 205			

Will Iran eliminate its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% by 31 Dec 2024?


Crowd Forecast: 0% chance | **Most likely outcome:** stockpile increases (94% chance)

AI Summarization of Rationales: Most forecasters believe Iran will continue expanding its 60% enriched uranium stockpile, citing Iran's past behavior and current geopolitical tensions. However, some allow for potential, though unlikely, diplomatic or technical factors leading to a partial reduction.

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<p><i>Reasons for stockpile elimination or partial reduction.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduction As A Diplomatic Gesture: Iran may make a token reduction to ease international pressure and maintain diplomatic relations. 	<p><i>Reasons for stockpile increase.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resistance to Sanctions: Iran has consistently increased its stockpile and production capacity despite sanctions and is unlikely to halt or reverse course voluntarily. • Regional Tensions: Given rising geopolitical tensions, Iran is unlikely to voluntarily give up a strategic asset and source of national pride. Iran may be incentivized to continue growing its stockpile for leverage.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Consensus Trend



Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	6 months	Number of Forecasters	80	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	1 month	Average for questions older than 6 months: 58			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	7	Number of Forecasts	427		
		Average for questions older than 6 months: 205			

Will a JCPOA participant country begin the process of imposing “snapback” sanctions on Iran by 31 Dec 2024?


Crowd Forecast: 3% chance

AI Summarization of Rationales: While Iran's activities raise tensions, the current conflicts in the Middle East and focus on Russia make snapback sanctions unlikely without a major provocation.

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Possible Backlash to Iranian Activity: Iran continues to push boundaries through missile strikes and uranium enrichment, which could prompt a reaction from the West. ● Iran’s Support for Russia and Regional Proxies: Heightened tensions between Iran and the West, particularly due to Iran's support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine and for proxies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthis may spur individual JCPOA members like the UK to impose snapback sanctions. ● Possible Detection of Weapons-Grade Uranium: Iran may be working towards 90% enriched (i.e., “weapons-grade”) uranium, and P3 countries (the United States, France, and the United Kingdom) have stated that the detection of weapons-grade uranium in Iran is a “red line” that would trigger snapback sanctions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Risk of Regional Escalation: The Israel-Hamas war deters Western JCPOA members from imposing snapback sanctions, as it risks escalating the conflict in the Middle East. ● Western Focus Elsewhere: The U.S. and European members seem focused on other issues. ● Sanctions May Backfire: Imposing sanctions could further isolate Iran, pushing it closer to Russia and China.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Crowd Consensus



Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	8 months	Number of Forecasters	54	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	1 month	Average for questions older than 6 months: 58			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	6	Number of Forecasts	298		
		Average for questions older than 6 months: 205			

Will Iran announce it will leave the JCPOA before 1 Jan 2025?


Crowd Forecast: 5% chance

AI Summarization of Rationales: While some scenarios could cause Iran to leave the JCPOA before 2025, the consensus is that it is unlikely Iran would see enough benefit to make such an announcement in the forecast time period.

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Signal of Displeasure: Leaving would signal displeasure with the West and Israel. • New Deal: Iran hopes to negotiate a new, more favorable deal in place of the JCPOA. • Iran's Nuclear Goals: Iran may leave the deal if it wants to openly pursue nuclear ambitions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sanctions Relief: Leaving would remove the economic benefits Iran receives from sanctions relief under the deal. • Diplomacy: Leaving could further diplomatically isolate Iran. • Continuing Status Quo: Iran can continue violating the deal while remaining a member. • Ambiguity as Political Power: Leaving would remove the ambiguity Iran relies on for strategic advantages.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Consensus Trend



Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	7 months	Number of Forecasters	88	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	2 months	Average for questions older than 6 months: 58			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	5	Number of Forecasts	420		
		Average for questions older than 6 months: 205			

Will Iran agree to limit uranium enrichment to 5% or less in the next six months?


Crowd Forecast: 0% chance

AI Summarization of Rationales: Forecasts suggest it is highly unlikely that Iran will agree to limit uranium enrichment to 5% or less in the next six months.

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● U.S. Elections: The November U.S. elections provide a slight possibility Iran might agree to limit enrichment if it would benefit them under a Biden administration. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Accelerating Uranium Enrichment: Iran has continued to enrich uranium to higher levels and has signaled no intention to limit enrichment. ● Global Tensions: Ongoing tensions between Iran and the U.S./Israel reduce the chances of an agreement. ● Iran's bargaining position: Iran feels emboldened and believes limiting enrichment would undermine its bargaining position.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Crowd Consensus



Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	6 months	Number of Forecasters	93	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	2 months	Average for questions older than 6 months: 58			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	10	Number of Forecasts	429		
		Average for questions older than 6 months: 205			

Will Iran be at war with another country in the next year?


Crowd Forecast: 3% chance

AI Summarization of Rationales: While tensions remain high, especially with Israel and the U.S., direct military confrontation in the near term appears unlikely given Iran's strategic interests. However, the possibility of conflict sparked by a significant incident cannot be ruled out.

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gaza Conflict: Iran could use the humanitarian crisis in Gaza as a pretext to declare war on Israel. • Nuclear Weapons: If Iran develops nuclear weapons, Israel may consider it reason enough to attack Iran. • Iran's Attack on U.S. Troops: The recent attack in Jordan that killed U.S. troops could escalate tensions and lead to war between Iran and the U.S. • Israel May Attack Nuclear Facilities: Israel might attack Iran's nuclear facilities which could lead to war between the countries. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Potential for Internal Instability: War would likely destabilize Iran domestically, which would threaten the regime. • Iran's Preference for Proxies: Iran prefers to wage proxy wars rather than direct confrontation. • Time for Military Build Up: Iran wants to build up military strength before any major confrontation. • Diplomacy: Diplomatic efforts are ongoing to de-escalate tensions in the region.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Crowd Consensus



Crowd Forecast Profile


Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	2 months	Number of Forecasters	60	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	24 days	Average for questions in their first 3 months: 48			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	8	Number of Forecasts	123		
		Average for questions in their first 3 months: 101			

B. Resolved Questions

This section presents the forecast questions in this decomposition that have been resolved. A question is “resolved” when the outcome is known and forecasts can be judged for accuracy.


Will any listed Muslim-majority country sign an agreement establishing or normalizing diplomatic relations with Israel in 2023?

Final Crowd Forecast: Yes - 1%, No - 99% | **Correct Answer:** No



Will Ali Khamenei flee Iran or cease to be Supreme Leader before 1 March 2024?

Final Crowd Forecast: Yes - 0%, No - 100% | **Correct Answer:** No



C. Impact Assessment of Individual Signals

The following table shows INFER's assessment of how each forecast signal **advances**, **mitigates**, or **maintains** status quo conditions on the likelihood of Iran developing a nuclear weapon.

Impact of signals on broader issue: Will Iran develop a nuclear weapon?

Driver	Signal / Forecast Question	Possible Answer	Impact to Issue Outcome
External Threat Environment	Will any listed Muslim-majority country sign an agreement establishing or normalizing diplomatic relations with Israel in the next six months?	Yes	Advances
		No	Maintains status quo
	Will any of the following countries recognize Israel's statehood by 31 December 2024?	Kuwait	Advances
		Oman	Advances
		Qatar	Advances
		Saudi Arabia	Advances
		Tunisia	Advances
	Will Russia deliver the below weapons systems to Iran before 1 February 2025?	S-400 or S-500 missile system	Advances
		Su-35 fighter jets	Advances
	Will there be an attack on an Iranian nuclear- or missile-related facility in the next 6 months?	Yes	May advance or mitigate
		No	May maintain status quo or mitigate
Internal Preferences in Iran	Will Ali Khamenei flee Iran or cease to be Supreme Leader in the next year?	Yes	May advance or mitigate
	By 31 December 2024, will uranium enriched to 90% or	Yes	Advances
		No	Maintains status quo

	more be discovered in an Iranian facility, according to the IAEA?		
	Will Iran eliminate its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% by 31 December 2024, according to the IAEA?	Yes, the stockpile will be reduced by 100% to 0 kg	Mitigates
		No, the stockpile will be reduced by 50% or more (>0 kg - 61.8 kg)	Mitigates
		No, the stockpile will be reduced by less than 50% or stay the same (>61.8 kg - 123.6 kg)	Maintains status quo
		No, the stockpile will increase (>123.6 kg)	Advances
International Incentives and Disincentives for Nuclear Development	Will a JCPOA participant country begin the process of imposing “snapback” sanctions on Iran by 31 December 2024?	Yes	Advances
		No	Maintains status quo
	Before 1 January 2025, will Iran announce that it will leave the JCPOA ("Iran nuclear deal")?	Yes	Advances
		No	Maintains status quo
	Will Iran agree to limit uranium enrichment to 5% or less in the next 6 months?	Yes	Mitigates
Regional Conflict	Iran goes to war with another country in the next year	Yes	Advances
		No	Maintains status quo

D. The Forecasters

The forecasters who have participated thus far in these questions have the following profile:

- 279 forecasters made 5,605 total forecasts
- 60% of forecasts were made by “INFER Pros” - current participants in INFER’s Pro Forecaster Program, who were selected based on their accuracy track record of at least 1 year on INFER or other similar forecasting sites or programs.

Demographics

Country	% of Forecasters
USA	47%
Canada, UK, Australia, New Zealand	7%
Europe (not UK)	19%
Latin America, Caribbean	15%
Asia	11%
Africa	1%

E. Methodology for Rationale Summaries

Rationales of INFER forecasters have been selected and summarized by Claude, an AI assistant tool created by Anthropic. To build the rationale summaries presented in this report, we provided Claude with forecast probabilities and narrative rationales, which generated multi-sentence summaries and bulleted lists of arguments. We then manually edited the summaries for completeness and readability to ensure that they accurately represented forecasters' rationales.

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