

INFER Issue Report

Iran's Progress Towards a Nuclear Weapon

December 2023

This report is a summation of crowdsourced predictions. It should not be viewed as an analytic product.

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Iran’s Progress Towards a Nuclear Weapon

Iran has been steadily building its nuclear weapons capability since 2019, when it first began ignoring limitations set under the JCPOA. This heatmap analyzes crowd forecasts from the signals below to show whether INFER’s forecasts indicate that momentum towards Iran building a nuclear weapon is increasing, decreasing, or staying the same across various indicators.

Decreasing Momentum Status Quo Increasing Momentum

Drivers	Signals		INFER Probability Forecast		
			31 Oct	30 Nov	31 Dec
Attacks on Nuclear or Military Facilities	Attack on an Iranian nuclear or missile facility in the next six months		12%	10%	11% chance
Coordination between Iran’s enemies and competitors	[RESOLVED] Muslim-majority country establishes or normalizes diplomatic relations with Israel by 31 Dec 2023		3%	1%	RESOLUTION: NO FINAL FORECAST: 1%
	Middle Eastern or North African country recognizes Israel’s statehood by 31 Dec 2024	Saudi Arabia	8%	7%	5%
		Oman	3%	4%	3%
		Qatar	2%	3%	2%
		Kuwait	2%	3%	2%
		Tunisia	2%	2%	2%
Military support from Russia and China	Russia delivers missile systems or fighter jets to Iran before 1 Feb 2025	Su-35	8%	18%	21%
		S-400 or S-500	8%	9%	8%
Leadership changes	Ali Khamenei flees Iran or ceases to be Supreme Leader before 1 Mar 2024		1%	1%	1%
Nuclear development	IAEA discovers uranium enriched to 90% or more in Iran by 31 Dec 2024		6%	5%	6%
	Iran eliminates, reduces, or grows its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% by 31 Dec 2024*	Eliminates	0%	0%	0%
		Reduces by 50%+	2%	1%	1%
		Reduces by less than 50% or stays the same	6%	6%	4%
		Increases	92%	93%	94%
International agreements and sanctions	JCPOA participant country begins the process of imposing “snapback” sanctions on Iran by 31 Dec 2024		3%	3%	3%
	Iran announces it will leave the JCPOA before 1 Jan 2025		9%	8%	7%
	Iran agrees to limit uranium enrichment to 5% or less in next 6 months		2%	2%	1%

* Low probability forecasts on this multi-choice question have differing implications for Iran’s progress towards a nuclear weapon depending on whether forecasters place a higher probability on Iran growing, shrinking, or keeping their stockpile the same.

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A. Forecast Trend Charts and Rationale Summaries

Will there be an attack on an Iranian nuclear- or missile-related facility in the next six months?


Crowd Forecast: 11% chance

AI Summarization of Rationales: While Israel has motivation to attack, the short timeframe, U.S. opposition, blowback concerns, and diplomatic progress between the U.S. and Iran are argued as mitigating factors by many forecasts. However, some perceive a non-trivial chance of a limited or clandestine Israeli attack.

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat to Israel: Israel views Iran's nuclear program as an existential threat in light of continued uranium enrichment and development of new missiles. As a result, Israel may take unilateral action to slow it down or act preventatively before Iran can develop a nuclear weapons capability. Several forecasts cite Israel's history of such attacks, such as Stuxnet and assassinations of nuclear scientists. • Potential Israeli Retaliation: Israel may want to retaliate against Iran for supporting Hamas' and Hezbollah's attacks on Israel. Some forecasts speculate Israel could attack to send a warning signal to Iran. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sanction Relief Deterrent: The informal "less for less" agreement where Iran limits enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief from the U.S. creates disincentives for an attack. • Other Focuses: The U.S. is focused on Russia/Ukraine and China/Taiwan and is unlikely to support an attack that could destabilize the region further. Several forecasts cite U.S. opposition as a restraining factor for Israel. • Attack Challenges: Physical destruction of underground facilities is difficult and cyberattacks take long planning. The six month timeframe makes a successful attack less likely per some forecasts. • Potential for Escalated Violence Towards Israel: Starting a war with Iran would escalate violence against Israel through Iranian proxies. Potential blowback is seen as a deterrent by some forecasts.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Consensus Trend



Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	5 months	Number of Forecasters	84	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	1 month	Average for questions in their first 6 months: 54			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	1	Number of Forecasts	310		
		Average for questions in their first 6 months: 150			

Will a listed Middle Eastern / North African country recognize Israel's statehood by 31 Dec 2024?

Crowd Forecast: 5% chance (Saudi Arabia)


AI Summarization of Rationales: Saudi Arabia is seen as most likely but still low probability to recognize Israel's statehood by the end of 2024. The others are highly unlikely barring major geopolitical shifts in the region. Recent violence between Israel and Hamas makes recognition even less likely in the near term.

Main arguments regarding whether each country may recognize Israel's statehood by December 31, 2024

- **Kuwait:** Very unlikely to recognize Israel before a Palestinian state is established. Kuwait has a large Palestinian diaspora and has strongly supported Palestinian rights. Some argue Kuwait may follow Saudi Arabia's lead if they recognize Israel.
- **Oman:** Unlikely to recognize Israel as Oman had made some gestures towards Israel like allowing overflights and welcoming Netanyahu, but recently backtracked. Oman has said it won't recognize Israel without a Palestinian state. It also wants to maintain neutrality and balance ties with Iran. Overall, arguments are it will likely wait for Saudi Arabia or a comprehensive Israel-Palestine agreement before recognizing Israel.
- **Qatar:** Unlikely to recognize Israel soon given its support for Hamas and close Iran ties, although it has maintained some unofficial contacts with Israel. If Saudi Arabia normalizes relations, Qatar may eventually follow, but the current environment makes recognition very unlikely in the near future.
- **Saudi Arabia:** Most likely of the group to recognize Israel, given increasing behind-the-scenes cooperation on security and shared threat perceptions regarding Iran. But domestic opposition and the need for concessions on Palestine are obstacles. Some see a deal as inevitable but requiring more time. Recent violence has been a setback.
- **Tunisia:** Very unlikely to recognize Israel anytime soon given domestic politics and strong pro-Palestinian sentiment. Tunisia has proposed laws to criminalize normalization with Israel. May eventually follow others but is not leading on recognition.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Consensus Trend



Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	6 months	Number of Forecasters	76	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	1 month	Average for questions in their first 6 months: 54			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	3	Number of Forecasts	324		
		Average for questions in their first 6 months: 150			

Will Russia deliver S-400/S-500 missile systems or Su-35 fighter jets to Iran before 1 Feb 2025?

Crowd Forecast: 8% chance (missiles); 21% chance (jets)

AI Summarization of Rationales: Russia may provide advanced missiles or jets to Iran to strengthen military ties and boost influence, but constraints arising from the Ukraine war and regional tension risks could hamper deals.


Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<p><i>Reasons Russia may deliver S-400/S-500 missile systems to Iran:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military Cooperation Precedent: Russia and Iran are strengthening military cooperation, and Russia delivered S-300 missiles to Iran in 2016, so there is precedent for missile system transfers between the countries. • Solidify Alliance with Iran: Providing advanced air defense capabilities could help Russia solidify its alliance with Iran and counterbalance U.S./NATO influence in the Middle East. • Negotiating Leverage: Russia may use potential missile system sales as leverage in negotiations with Iran over acquiring military assets like drones and other military equipment needed for the Ukraine war. 	<p><i>Reasons Russia may not deliver S-400/S-500 missile systems to Iran:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Homeland Security Needs: Russia's domestic issues and the Ukraine crisis could lead to reallocation of air defense assets for homeland security rather than exports to Iran. • Tension in Middle East: If Israel strongly opposes a deal where Russia delivers weapons systems to Iran, Russia may reconsider providing advanced missiles to avoid escalating regional tensions. • Arms Retrieval: Russia has been retrieving previously exported arms to replenish stocks depleted by the Ukraine war, signaling reluctance to part with air defense systems.
<p><i>Reasons Russia may deliver Su-35 fighter jets to Iran:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase Russian influence in Middle East: Russia sees it as an opportunity to increase influence in the Middle East and counter Western powers. • Evidence of Deal: Reports that a deal for jets to be delivered has already been finalized. • Negotiating Leverage: Russia may use potential jet sales as leverage in negotiations with Iran over acquiring military assets like drones and other military equipment needed for the Ukraine war. 	<p><i>Reasons Russia may not deliver Su-35 fighter jets to Iran:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russian Military Needs: Russia has high domestic demand for Su-35s for its own military operations in Ukraine as the air war intensifies. • Significant Support Required from Russia: Advanced jets require substantial training, maintenance and logistical support that Russia may not have bandwidth to provide Iran due to Ukraine focus. • Concerns Over Iran's Weakening Relations: Deteriorating relations with Iran's adversaries like Israel and Saudi Arabia

could make Russia wary of backlash.

- **Production Time Considerations:**
Production constraints may make timely delivery of jets difficult.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Consensus Trend



Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	5 months	Number of Forecasters	61	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	1 month	Average for questions in their first 6 months: 54			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	3	Number of Forecasts	263		
		Average for questions in their first 6 months: 150			

Will Ali Khamenei flee Iran or cease to be Supreme Leader before 1 Mar 2024?


Crowd Forecast: 1% chance

AI Summarization of Rationales: Most forecasts see Khamenei's death from natural causes in the next year as the most likely way he would cease to be Supreme Leader, though the probability is still low. Ouster by protests, coup, or external action is seen as even less likely in the short timeframe by most forecasts.

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Khamenei's Health: Khamenei is 84 years old and has had some health issues in the past, so he may die or become incapacitated due to natural causes in the next year. • Public Dissatisfaction: There is widespread public disillusionment and protests against the regime, so Khamenei could be forced out by a popular uprising or coup, though forecasts see this as unlikely in the short timeframe. • Economic issues: Economic problems like high inflation could further destabilize the regime and leadership. • Potential Israeli Threat: Israel sees Iran/Khamenei as an enemy and may take action especially if facing domestic political issues, though this is seen as very unlikely. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resiliency: Khamenei has ruled firmly as Supreme Leader since 1989, and the regime has proven very resilient against protests and pressures in the past. • Significant Iranian Support: The Assembly of Experts and Revolutionary Guard currently support Khamenei, making a coup or ouster by political elites unlikely. • No Clear Replacement: There is no clear organized opposition or alternative leadership to take over, so protests are unlikely to fully topple the regime. • Ties with Russia and China: Increased economic ties with Russia/China help prop up the regime.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Consensus Trend



Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	9 months	Number of Forecasters	89	Participants in this question	better than
Average forecast age	1 month	Average for questions older than 6 months: 57		vs. all forecasters	average ⓘ
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	2	Number of Forecasts	605		
		Average for questions older than 6 months: 197			

Will uranium enriched to 90% or more be discovered in an Iranian facility according to the IAEA by 31 Dec 2024?


Crowd Forecast: 6% chance

AI Summarization of Rationales: Iran likely has the capability to enrich to 90%, but may be incentivized not to allow discovery. Actual IAEA discovery seems unlikely given Iran's restrictions on inspectors. However, some see a possibility of Iran itself revealing limited 90%+ enrichment as a strategic signal.

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Iran Advancing Enrichment: Iran has already produced uranium enriched up to 83.7% in the past, indicating they likely have the capability to enrich to 90% or more. ● Increasing Stockpile of 60%: Iran continues to steadily increase its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60%, giving it a ready supply to potentially enrich further. Recent IAEA reports show Iran's 60% stockpile growing. ● Inspector Access: Iran banned many IAEA inspectors, but some inspectors still have access, so discovery is still possible. The IAEA could detect and report on weapons-grade uranium even with limited inspector access. ● Iranian Ambitions: Iran aims to become a nuclear power and may want to signal having achieved weapons-grade enrichment, even if it doesn't yet have an actual bomb. Enriching to 90%+ could serve as a threat. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Potential Provocation: Crossing the 90% enrichment threshold is seen as a major red line that could provoke serious backlash against Iran, so it has incentive to avoid clearly crossing it. ● Allies May Disapprove: Iran's main allies like Russia and China likely discourage Iran from openly enriching to 90% as it would dangerously destabilize the region. ● Enrichment Could Go Unnoticed: If Iran enriches to 90%, it would likely do so in secret facilities away from IAEA inspectors. Iran banned inspectors from key sites. ● High Bar for Confirmation: The IAEA has accepted Iran's explanations before for traces of highly enriched uranium as unintentional fluctuations. This suggests a high bar for confirming weapons-grade enrichment. ● Controversial to Report: Politically, it may not be advantageous for the IAEA to report such a controversial finding even if inspectors did detect 90%+ enriched uranium.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Consensus Trend



Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	5 months	Number of Forecasters	70	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	1 month	Average for questions in their first 6 months: 54			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	3	Number of Forecasts	311		
		Average for questions in their first 6 months: 150			

Will Iran eliminate its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% by 31 Dec 2024?


Crowd Forecast: 0% chance | Most likely outcome: stockpile increases (94% chance)

AI Summarization of Rationales: Most argue it is improbable that Iran will willingly reduce its stockpile substantially without a major shift internally or externally. The most likely outcome appears to be a continued increase in Iran's 60% enriched uranium holdings. However, IAEA's capacity to accurately assess and report totals introduces some uncertainty.

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<p><i>Reasons for stockpile elimination or partial reduction.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Possible Political Shifts: The only scenarios where Iran might significantly reduce or eliminate their stockpile are if there is change in leadership, a new nuclear deal is reached, or extreme external pressure forces them to. However, most believe these scenarios in the next year are very unlikely. • Peaceful Gesture: Iran could make a small reduction as a diplomatic gesture or result of diluting enriched uranium for energy purposes, however most don't expect major concessions. 	<p><i>Reasons for stockpile increase.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ongoing Tensions: This seems the most likely outcome given rising regional tensions, Iran's previous actions, and its strategic interests. The program is a source of national pride and leverage. Without a new nuclear deal or strong external pressure, Iran has incentives to continue expanding its stockpile.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Consensus Trend



Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	3 months	Number of Forecasters	65	Participants in this question	better than
Average forecast age	28 days	Average for questions in their first 6 months: 54		vs. all forecasters	average ⓘ
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	0	Number of Forecasts	208		
		Average for questions in their first 6 months: 150			

Will a JCPOA participant country begin the process of imposing “snapback” sanctions on Iran by 31 Dec 2024?


Crowd Forecast: 3% chance

AI Summarization of Rationales: The combination of geopolitical considerations and lack of unity among JCPOA members make snapback sanctions unlikely, but some forecasters see non-zero possibilities depending on changing circumstances.

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Possible Nuclear Or Military Developments: If compromising evidence emerges from future IAEA inspections, or if the regional conflicts escalate substantially, the calculus could change and a JCPOA participant may choose to impose snapback sanctions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Preference For Peace: The current JCPOA participants (UK, France, Germany, EU, Russia, and China) oppose snapback sanctions and prefer negotiation and diplomacy. The U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, so it lacks standing to trigger snapback sanctions unilaterally. Opposition From Iran’s Allies: Russia and China, as JCPOA members aligned with Iran, would certainly block any effort to trigger snapback sanctions. Involvement Over Isolation: European countries fear that snapback sanctions could further isolate Iran and push it closer to Russia/China. They believe keeping Iran engaged diplomatically is better than punishing it. No Desire To Disrupt Diplomacy: Imposing snapback sanctions now could undermine ongoing U.S. efforts to de-escalate tensions with Iran. Fears Of Increasing Tensions: The continuing Israel-Gaza conflict makes European countries hesitant to rock the boat with sanctions.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Crowd Consensus



Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	5 months	Number of Forecasters	43	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	1 month	Average for questions in their first 6 months: 54			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	0	Number of Forecasts	179		
		Average for questions in their first 6 months: 150			

Will Iran announce it will leave the JCPOA before 1 Jan 2025?


Crowd Forecast: 7% chance

AI Summarization of Rationales: The crowd believes it's more advantageous for Iran to stay in the deal while violating it, rather than formally withdrawing and facing consequences. However, volatile geopolitics introduce uncertainty longer-term.

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threats And Sanctions: If Iran is found to be significantly violating the deal, such as enriching uranium over 90%, it could lead to snapback sanctions or military action that causes Iran to leave. • Heightened Conflict: Escalation of tensions and conflict in the region, especially with Israel, could lead Iran to abandon the deal and pursue nuclear capabilities more aggressively. • Internal Politics: Domestic political changes in Iran's leadership could bring hardliners to power who want to exit the deal. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic Benefits: Iran benefits from sanctions relief and economic opportunities by staying in the JCPOA. Leaving would expose it to more sanctions and isolation. • Driving A Wedge Between The U.S. And Europe: Iran wants to maintain the appearance of abiding by the deal to divide the U.S. and Europe. They blame U.S. withdrawal for non-compliance. • National And International Pressures: Iran faces domestic and international pressure to avoid nuclear escalation and says it seeks only peaceful nuclear capabilities. • Maintaining A Sense Of Ambiguity: Iran can continue gradually violating the deal without formally exiting to maintain ambiguity.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Consensus Trend



Crowd Forecast Profile

Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	4 months	Number of Forecasters	79	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	1 month	Average for questions in their first 6 months: 54			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	0	Number of Forecasts	265		
		Average for questions in their first 6 months: 150			

Will Iran agree to limit uranium enrichment to 5% or less in the next six months?


Crowd Forecast: 1% chance

AI Summarization of Rationales: Forecasts suggest it is highly improbable Iran will agree to curb enrichment within six months given the current geopolitical climate and lack of incentives. However, a slim possibility exists.

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Possible If Offered Incentives: It is technically possible for Iran to unilaterally announce enrichment limits or return to compliance with the JCPOA. However, this is still unlikely without incentives. ● International Collaboration: The IAEA is urging renewed dialogue and some minimal international consensus. ● Low Chance Of Breakthrough: There is a slim chance of an unexpected breakthrough in negotiations within six months. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Time Constraints: Negotiating a new deal would take longer than six months. The original JCPOA negotiations took 20 months. There are no active discussions currently taking place that could achieve this. ● Lack Of Concessions: Iran gains leverage by continuing enrichment above 5%, so has little incentive to agree to limits without substantial concessions or incentives from the West. ● Conflict Preventing Negotiation: Ongoing tensions between Iran and Israel/the U.S. make it politically difficult for the U.S. to negotiate. ● Iran Strengthening Relationships With Allies: Iran's growing ties with Russia suggest decreasing reliance on the West. Limiting enrichment would go against Iran's strategic interests. ● National Pride: Enrichment is a source of national pride and sovereignty for Iran. They are unlikely to voluntarily curb capabilities. ● Immune To Pressure: Iran seems indifferent to sanctions and international pressure related to its nuclear program. ● Lack Of Credibility And Trust: The U.S. and European powers currently lack credibility in Iran's eyes after failing to uphold the original JCPOA terms. The lack of trust between Iran and Western countries, particularly the U.S., adds to the skepticism that Iran would agree to any limitations.

[See detailed rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Crowd Consensus



Crowd Forecast Profile


Recency of Forecasts		Participation Level		Accuracy	
Question age	3 months	Number of Forecasters	79	Participants in this question vs. all forecasters	better than average ⓘ
Average forecast age	27 days	Average for questions in their first 6 months: 54			
Forecasts in the last 24 hours	0	Number of Forecasts	236		
		Average for questions in their first 6 months: 150			

B. Resolved Questions

This section presents the forecast questions that have been resolved in December. A question is “resolved” when the outcome is known and forecasts can be judged for accuracy.

Will any listed Muslim-majority country sign an agreement establishing or normalizing diplomatic relations with Israel in 2023?

Final Crowd Forecast: Yes - 1%, No - 99% | **Correct Answer:** No



----- Correct answer became the crowd's highest probability answer - Apr 15, 2023 05:27PM (261 days before close, question was 8% complete)

C. Impact Assessment of Individual Signals

The following table shows INFER's assessment of how each forecast signal **advances**, **mitigates**, or **maintains** status quo conditions on the likelihood of Iran developing a nuclear weapon.

Impact of signals on broader issue: Will Iran develop a nuclear weapon?

Driver	Signal / Forecast Question	Possible Answer	Impact to Issue Outcome
External Threat Environment	Will any listed Muslim-majority country sign an agreement establishing or normalizing diplomatic relations with Israel by 31 December 2023?	Yes	Advances
		No	Maintains status quo
	Will any of the following countries recognize Israel's statehood by 31 December 2024?	Kuwait	Advances
		Oman	Advances
		Qatar	Advances
		Saudi Arabia	Advances
		Tunisia	Advances
	Will Russia deliver the below weapons systems to Iran before 1 February 2025?	S-400 or S-500 missile system	Advances
		Su-35 fighter jets	Advances
	Will there be an attack on an Iranian nuclear- or missile-related facility in the next 6 months?	Yes	May advance or mitigate
		No	May maintain status quo or mitigate
Internal Preferences in Iran	Will Ali Khamenei flee Iran or cease to be Supreme Leader before 1 March 2024?	Yes	May advance or mitigate
	By 31 December 2024, will	Yes	Advances

	uranium enriched to 90% or more be discovered in an Iranian facility, according to the IAEA?	No	Maintains status quo
	Will Iran eliminate its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% by 31 December 2024, according to the IAEA?	Yes, the stockpile will be reduced by 100% to 0 kg	Mitigates
		No, the stockpile will be reduced by 50% or more (>0 kg - 61.8 kg)	Mitigates
		No, the stockpile will be reduced by less than 50% or stay the same (>61.8 kg - 123.6 kg)	Maintains status quo
		No, the stockpile will increase (>123.6 kg)	Advances
International Incentives and Disincentives for Nuclear Development	Will a JCPOA participant country begin the process of imposing “snapback” sanctions on Iran by 31 December 2024?	Yes	Advances
		No	Maintains status quo
	Before 1 January 2025, will Iran announce that it will leave the JCPOA ("Iran nuclear deal")?	Yes	Advances
		No	Maintains status quo
	Will Iran agree to limit uranium enrichment to 5% or less in the next 6 months?	Yes	Mitigates

D. The Forecasters

The forecasters who have participated thus far in these questions have the following profile:

- 219 forecasters made 3,613 total forecasts
- 74% of forecasts were made by “INFER Pros” - participants in INFER’s Pro Forecaster Program, who were selected based on their accuracy track record of at least 1 year on INFER or other similar forecasting sites or programs.

Demographics

Country	% of Forecasters
USA	42%
Canada, UK, Australia, New Zealand	6%
Europe (not UK)	22%
Latin America, Caribbean	18%
Asia	12%
Africa	1%

E. Methodology for Rationale Summaries

Rationales of INFER forecasters have been selected and summarized by Claude, an AI assistant tool created by Anthropic. To build the rationale summaries presented in this report, we provided Claude with forecast probabilities and narrative rationales, which generated multi-sentence summaries and bulleted lists of arguments. We then manually edited the summaries for completeness and readability to ensure that they accurately represented forecasters' rationales.

[Interested in an issue decomposition on another topic? >>](#)