


East Asia & Pacific Region • South & Central Asia Region

Will Myanmar hold national elections on or before 31 December 2023?

5% chance

Down 24% from 7/13/23
Based on 411 forecasts




[See detailed forecast rationales](#) • [See consensus trend and crowd profile](#)

Will Prayut Chan-o-cha be re-elected as prime minister of Thailand by the Thai parliament after the next election and before 1 Jan 2024?

1% chance

No change from 7/13/23
Based on 210 forecasts




[See detailed forecast rationales](#) • [See consensus trend and crowd profile](#)

Will the Global Protest Tracker record a significant antigovernment protest involving 10,000 or more participants in Thailand between April 2023 and April 2024?

30% chance

Up 12% since 7/13/23
Based on 197 forecasts




[See detailed forecast rationales](#) • [See consensus trend and crowd profile](#)

Will the Pheu Thai Party be part of a governing coalition in Thailand after the next election and before 1 Jan 2024?

98% chance

Up 7% from 7/13/23
Based on 230 forecasts




[See detailed forecast rationales](#) • [See consensus trend and crowd profile](#)

Will Imran Khan be re-elected as prime minister following Pakistan’s upcoming general election?

3% chance

Down 4% from 7/13/23
Based on 208 forecasts



[See detailed forecast rationales](#) • [See consensus trend and crowd profile](#)

APPENDIX: Rationale Summaries, Resolved Questions & Additional Reporting Details

A. Rationale Summaries By Forecast Question.....	3
• Will Myanmar hold national elections on or before 31 December 2023?.....	3
• Will Prayut Chan-o-cha be re-elected as prime minister of Thailand by the Thai parliament after the next election and before 1 Jan 2024?.....	4
• Will the Global Protest Tracker record a significant anti-government protest involving 10,000 or more participants in Thailand between April 2023 and April 2024?.....	5
• Will the Pheu Thai Party be part of a governing coalition in Thailand after the next election and before 1 Jan 2024?.....	6
• Will Imran Khan be re-elected as prime minister following Pakistan’s upcoming general election?.....	7
B. The Forecasters.....	8
C. Report Methodology.....	9

A. Rationale Summaries By Forecast Question

This section presents a high-level summary of forecasters' rationales for each question in the report, along with the crowd forecast and change in consensus since the last report (in parentheses). Rationales can be found in full by clicking “See detailed forecast rationales”, and a list of sources linked within rationales can be found by clicking “See source links”. The data in this report is from 1 July through 18 August 2023.

Will Myanmar hold national elections on or before 31 December 2023?

Crowd Forecast: 5% chance (+24%) | [See detailed forecast rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Elections legitimizing power: The junta wants to hold elections to legitimize their rule, even if they are sham elections. They have made some preparations like conducting a census. • Partial elections possible: The junta may focus elections on areas it controls to gain some credibility. Even partial elections may be enough to fulfill the question. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State of emergency extended: The state of emergency was extended until February 2024, making elections this year very unlikely. The junta says polls will only occur after emergency goals are met, with no timeline given. They may delay as long as possible to retain power. • Lack of time: There are no signs of preparation for elections, no date set, and tenders for staging elections were withdrawn. Time is running out to organize elections in 2024. • Continued conflict: The country is still in turmoil with fighting between armed forces and junta-sponsored militias. Holding elections could worsen conflict. • Election verification procedures: Logistical requirements for parties to contest elections have been made more onerous, hindering opposition. • Little external pressure: External actors like China would prefer the military stay in power and are unlikely to push for elections.

Will Prayut Chan-o-cha be re-elected as prime minister of Thailand by the Thai parliament after the next election and before 1 Jan 2024?

Crowd Forecast: 1% chance (no change) | [See detailed forecast rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Divided opposition: If the opposition struggles to unite behind a new leader, Prayut Chan-o-cha could potentially take advantage of divisions among the opposition parties and put together a coalition with the help of the military-appointed Senate. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prayut's retirement: Prayut announced retirement from politics on July 11, 2023 after 9 years in office. Given Prayut's retirement announcement, it is unlikely he would go back on this and now has a very slim chance of re-election. • More likely alternatives: With Pita ruled out as PM, Prayut lacks strong party backing and a groundswell of support to draft him again. Other candidates seem better positioned, as Prayut's party came in fifth in constituency voting and opinion polls show him trailing major opponents. • Withdrawn support from allies: Key former allies have abandoned Prayut. The United Thai Nation Party (UTNP) party leader resigned as an MP and said he stands with Prayut until the last second, but later announced the party will not nominate Prayut as PM.

Will the Global Protest Tracker record a significant anti-government protest involving 10,000 or more participants in Thailand between April 2023 and April 2024?

Crowd Forecast: 30% chance (↑12%) | [See detailed forecast rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Undemocratic treatment of the Move Forward Party: The progressive Move Forward Party won the most seats in the May 2023 election, but the military-appointed Senate blocked their candidate, Pita Limjaroenrat, from becoming Prime Minister and excluded the party from the new governing coalition. This undemocratic move could spark large protests from supporters of democratic reform. • Historical precedent: There is a history of mass protests in Thailand, such as in 2020-2021 calling for democratic reforms. The Thai public has shown a willingness to protest in large numbers when they feel democracy is under threat, and young progressive groups seem willing to protest again if their demands are not met. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Size of recent protests (<10K): Recent protests have only drawn participant numbers in the hundreds or low thousands. To reach 10,000 participants would require a dramatic escalation in turnout. • Protester weariness: The Thai public may be protest-weary after years of political turmoil. There are indications that the appetite for large-scale demonstrations has died down. • Political compromise: If a compromise coalition government can form with moderates like the Pheu Thai party, this could satisfy enough of the public to avoid large-scale protests. Much depends on how the ongoing political negotiations play out. • Limited time: The time frame for this question extends until April 2024, but some forecasters suggest that, given how Thai politics moves, any major protests would need to happen in the next few months.

Will the Pheu Thai Party be part of a governing coalition in Thailand after the next election and before 1 Jan 2024?

Crowd Forecast: 98% chance (↑7%) | [See detailed forecast rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pheu Thai's popularity: Pheu Thai has a strong electoral presence, winning the second most seats after Move Forward in the May 2022 election. They have a solid base of support to build a coalition around. • New coalition: Even after Pheu Thai split from Move Forward to form a new coalition with Bhumjaithai and other conservative parties, they still command over 200 seats together. Joining with Palang Pracharath and United Thai Nation would give them a majority and secure broad parliamentary support. • Concessions on lese-majeste law: Pheu Thai has shown a willingness to compromise on demands like reforming the lese-majeste law in order to appease the military and gain their support in parliament. • Confidence around Pheu Thai's candidate: Several senators and political observers expressed confidence that Pheu Thai's candidate, Srettha Thavisin, would win the vote for prime minister, implying the coalition will govern. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New coalition may undermine Pheu Thai's populist identity: Move Forward were the largest party, so Pheu Thai risks losing popularity by abandoning their progressive coalition. There are doubts over whether the new Conservative coalition properly reflects the election result, and allying with conservative, pro-military parties could undermine their populist credentials. • Concessions risk alienating supporters: Pheu Thai split from Move Forward, the largest party, over disagreements about amending the lese-majeste law and other progressive policies. This may alienate some prior Pheu Thai supporters. • Possible institutional obstruction: The Constitutional Court and other institutions could delay or derail the new coalition's formation if they oppose it. For example, the Court suspended Move Forward's Pita Limjaroenrat as an MP.

Will Imran Khan be re-elected as prime minister following Pakistan's upcoming general election?

Crowd Forecast: 3% chance (+4%) | [See detailed forecast rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Court may overturn conviction: If the Supreme Court's chief justice is sympathetic to Khan, he could overturn Khan's conviction and ban on holding office, allowing him to contest the election. • Popular support: Khan retains popularity in Pakistan, especially middle and lower income groups. He draws big crowds at rallies showing he still has significant support, and some polls have shown his PTI party leading in voting intention. • Protests may build momentum: Khan could build momentum and public support through protests against his conviction. This could pressure the military and judiciary to allow him to participate. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Khan's conviction: Khan was recently convicted and sentenced to 3 years in prison on corruption charges related to improperly selling state gifts. This conviction also came with a 5 year ban on holding public office, which would prevent Khan from running in the upcoming election. While he plans to appeal, the conviction and ban significantly hurt his chances. • Lost support of the establishment: Khan has lost the support of Pakistan's powerful military establishment, which is seen as instrumental in determining who holds power. Without their backing, it will be very difficult for him to get re-elected. • Party resignations: Khan's party, PTI, has fractured recently with many leaders and members leaving. This splintering hurts his viability as a candidate.

B. The Forecasters

The forecasters who have participated thus far in these questions have the following profile:

- 118 total forecasters
- 53% are “INFER Pros” - participants in INFER’s Pro Forecaster Program, who were selected based on their accuracy track record of at least 1 year on INFER or other similar forecasting sites or programs.

Demographics

Country	Ratio
USA	41%
Canada, UK, Australia, New Zealand	10%
Europe	21%
Latin America, Caribbean	14%
Asia	13%
Africa	2%

C. Report Methodology

Rationales of INFER forecasters have been selected and summarized by Claude, an AI assistant tool created by Anthropic. To build the rationale summaries presented in this report, we provided forecasts (probabilities and narrative rationales) to Claude to summarize into bulleted lists of arguments. We then manually edited the bulleted summaries for accuracy and readability to ensure that each list item accurately represented forecasters' rationales and was assigned to the proper list.

Each question in the report also includes links to the crowd forecasts, rationales, and source links used by forecasters.