

Europe and Eurasia Region


Will Kosovo and Serbia sign an EU-backed proposal aimed at normalizing diplomatic relations by 30 June 2023?

1%

chance

Down 12% from 5/5/23

Based on 109 forecasts



[See detailed forecast rationales](#) • [See consensus trend and crowd profile](#)


Will Sweden become a full member of NATO before the NATO Summit in July 2023?

26%

chance

Up 1% from 5/5/23

Based on 241 forecasts



[See detailed forecast rationales](#) • [See consensus trend and crowd profile](#)


NEW ON INFER

Will Vladimir Putin cease to be the president of the Russian Federation before 1 May 2024?

8%

chance


Based on 148 forecasts



[See detailed forecast rationales](#) • [See consensus trend and crowd profile](#)

NEW ON INFER

What percentage of Ukrainian territory will be held by Russia in December 2023?



Based on 81 forecasts

[See detailed forecast rationales](#) • [See consensus trend and crowd profile](#)

APPENDIX: Forecaster Rationale Summaries

This section presents a high-level summary of forecasters' rationales for each question in the report. Rationales can be found in full by clicking “See detailed forecast rationales”, and a list of sources linked within rationales can be found by clicking “See source links”. The data in this report is from 1 May through 6 June 2023.

Will Kosovo and Serbia sign an EU-backed proposal aimed at normalizing diplomatic relations by 30 June 2023?.....	3
Will Sweden become a full member of NATO before the NATO Summit in July 2023?.....	4
Will Vladimir Putin cease to be the president of the Russian Federation before 1 May 2024?.....	5
What percentage of Ukrainian territory will be held by Russia in December 2023?.....	6
APPENDIX: The Forecasters.....	7
APPENDIX: Report Methodology.....	8

Will Kosovo and Serbia sign an EU-backed proposal aimed at normalizing diplomatic relations by 30 June 2023?

Crowd Forecast: 1% chance | [See detailed forecast rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desire for EU membership: Both sides want EU membership and good relations with the West. Signing a deal could help them achieve these goals, even if it's not a comprehensive agreement. • EU promised incentives: The EU has promised investment, aid, and integration benefits. While not fully credible, these incentives may motivate Serbia and Kosovo to sign an initial agreement. • Serbian public opinion: Public opinion in Serbia supports parts of the proposed deal, providing it excludes the formal recognition of Kosovo's independence and its membership in the United Nations. • Weakening Russia-Serbia relationship: Russia and Serbia's relationship may be weakening, reducing Russia's ability to block an agreement. As a forecaster speculated, "Vučić is probably reluctant to alienate Putin. On the other hand, he may see Putin's Russia as a sinking ship he should flee immediately." If Vučić sees Russia as a declining ally, he may be more willing to sign a deal, even without their approval. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of time: Diplomatic negotiations often take time. 30 June seems unrealistic given complex history and tensions between sides. • Ongoing tensions and conflicts: There have been recent clashes between ethnic Serbs and Kosovo authorities, and Serbia put its army on high alert, making an agreement by 30 June very unlikely. • Disagreement on the deal: While Kosovo and Serbia have agreed to implement parts of an EU-backed deal, leaders have acknowledged that significant disagreements remain. • Domestic opposition: There is a lack of political will and incentive, especially on Serbia's side. Serbia's president Vučić faces domestic political pressure not to recognize Kosovo's independence. He is reluctant to sign an agreement that would be seen as making major concessions. The promised EU membership and financial aid may not be enough incentive for Serbia to sign a deal. • Limited attention from the international community: The West's focus on other issues like Ukraine leaves little political capital to invest in mediating Serbia-Kosovo talks. Strong external pressure and incentives are needed to overcome the many obstacles, and the international community is focused on other issues. • Russian opposition: Russia opposes Kosovo's independence and may pressure Serbia not to sign an agreement. Serbia values its relationship with Russia, and Russia could threaten to withdraw political or economic support if Serbia recognizes Kosovo's independence.

Will Sweden become a full member of NATO before the NATO Summit in July 2023?

Crowd Forecast: 26% chance | [See detailed forecast rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Turkey's incentives change: Now that Erdogan has won re-election, Turkey may soften its opposition to Sweden joining NATO, especially if the US approves an F-16 sale that Turkey wants. Erdogan can gain politically by approving Sweden now that the election is over. • External pressure rising: There is increasing pressure from the US and NATO on Turkey to approve Sweden's bid before the July summit. Biden and Blinken have called Erdogan urging Turkey to move forward. • Demands met: Sweden has passed counter-terrorism legislation that Turkey demanded, removing one of Turkey's objections. • Hungary may follow suit: Hungary is likely to follow Turkey's lead. If Turkey approves Sweden, Hungary will likely do the same shortly after. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not enough time: There is little time left before the July NATO summit. Even if Turkey changes its position, the ratification process in Turkey and Hungary's parliaments may take too long. • High price expected: Erdogan knows this is the moment he has maximum leverage and will likely demand a high price for approving Sweden, which could stall the process. Turkey's relations with the West remain "transactional and tense." • Little incentive to cooperate: Erdogan has little incentive to cooperate now that he has won re-election. Turkey continues to demand Sweden extradite several Kurdish nationals that Ankara considers terrorists, and Erdogan can continue using Sweden's alleged support for Kurdish groups to gain popularity domestically. • Russian pressure on Hungary: Russia will pressure Hungary to block further NATO expansion. Hungary may not follow Turkey's lead, even if Turkey approves Sweden. • Turkey weighing Russian interests: Approving Sweden could upset Russia and hamper Turkey's negotiations with Russia on issues like grain exports through the Bosphorus Strait. Turkey will want to balance its relations with NATO and Russia.

Will Vladimir Putin cease to be the president of the Russian Federation before 1 May 2024?

Crowd Forecast: 8% chance | [See detailed forecast rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Higher probability forecasts discuss...	Lower probability forecasts discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military infighting: Increasing conflict within the Russian military, as evidenced by recent reports of the Russian military attacking Wagner forces. This could signal instability and infighting that threatens Putin's position. • Health rumors: Putin's health remains a source of speculation and uncertainty. If his health were to decline suddenly, he may have to step down. He is also of an advanced age (70), which increases health risks and actuarial probabilities of death. • Ukraine war worsens: A disastrous turn in the war in Ukraine could put enough pressure on Putin and Russia's institutions to force him out. Losing Crimea in particular might be damaging. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Authoritarian control: Putin has a firm grip on power and has consolidated control over Russian institutions. He has placed allies in key positions to protect his position. The chances of a successful coup or assassination are very low given how much control Putin maintains over security forces. • Chaos deterrent: Removal of Putin could plunge Russia into chaos, so those in power have little incentive to force him out. NATO and the West benefit from stability in Russia, so are unlikely to act directly against Putin. • Popularity in Russia: Putin continues to be popular and benefits from a cult of personality in Russia. He is still seen by many as the strongest leader for the country. There are no viable challengers and Putin has sidelined potential threats. • Favorable political conditions: Constitutional changes made in 2020 allow Putin to remain president until at least 2036, and he is expected to win the 2024 election. • International support: International factors like China's relationship with Russia and support for Putin also help sustain his position. • Healthy enough: Putin's health does not seem to be deteriorating significantly based on available information. The chances of natural death are still relatively low. While older, world leaders often live longer due to access to healthcare.

What percentage of Ukrainian territory will be held by Russia in December 2023?

Crowd Forecast most likely outcome: 60% chance of Russia holding 12-17% of Ukraine

[See detailed forecast rationales](#) | [See source links](#)

Forecasts anticipating more Russian control discuss...	Forecasts anticipating less Russian control discuss...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Russian control has been steady: Russia has held about 17% of Ukrainian territory since November. They are unlikely to retreat substantially, as Russia sees control of Ukraine as existential and strategic. ● Fortified defenses: Russia has built up significant fortifications and defensive lines, especially from Zaporizhzhia to Luhansk. Their defensive lines extend 25 km deep in some places, making it difficult for Ukraine to regain control of this territory. ● Ukraine stalled: Ukraine's promised counteroffensive has yet to materialize in a significant way. If it underperforms, Russia may even make small gains. ● Military capacity: Russia still has superiority over Ukraine in military resources and capabilities. Although they have faced difficulties, their greater scale means they are unlikely to lose control of large parts of territory. ● Counterattack threat: Russia could launch renewed offensives from Belarus or the eastern border to counter Ukraine's gains. ● Ukraine aid dependent: Ukraine is dependent on Western aid and weapons that may not continue at the same level. Ukraine risks heavy losses in a counteroffensive that could reduce its credibility and international support. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Challenges mounting, gains limited: Russia is facing major challenges including low morale, logistical issues, and a lack of reinforcement. They have struggled to make gains and even hold territory in some areas. ● Summer counteroffensive: Ukraine is planning a large-scale counteroffensive for the summer which is likely to push Russian forces back, although the amount of territory that will be regained is uncertain. Ukraine is motivated and gaining valuable experience. More advanced Western weapons promised to Ukraine could help in counteroffensives. ● Internal Russian tensions: There are tensions within the Russian forces, including open criticism of military leadership by allies like Prigozhin (Wagner Group). This hints at coordination and supply issues that weaken Russia's position. ● Diplomatic pressure: International pressure on Russia is rising, and peace negotiations or ceasefires are more likely which would freeze current positions. Russia may seek to legitimize current gains rather than expand territory. ● Public support dropping: Public support for the war is dropping in Russia, and economic impacts are rising. This could force Russia to limit its ambitions and territory in Ukraine.

APPENDIX: The Forecasters

The forecasters who have participated thus far in these questions have the following profile:

- 144 total forecasters
- 49% are “INFER Pros” - participants with an accuracy track record of at least 1 year on INFER or other similar forecasting sites or programs that has warranted their retention through our paid program.

Demographics

Country	Ratio
USA	40%
Canada, UK, Australia, New Zealand	7%
Europe	26%
Latin America, Caribbean	17%
Asia	9%
Africa	1%

APPENDIX: Report Methodology

Rationales of INFER forecasters have been selected and summarized by Claude, an AI assistant tool created by Anthropic. To build the rationale summaries presented in this report, we provided forecasts (probabilities and narrative rationales) to Claude to summarize into bulleted lists of arguments. We then manually edited the bulleted summaries for accuracy and readability to ensure that each list item accurately represented forecasters' rationales and was assigned to the proper list.

Each question in the report also includes links to the crowd forecasts, rationales, and source links used by forecasters.