lowering on Georgia slightly with time and with the lack of a ceasefire. If there had been a favorable ceasefire for Putin, I would have probably raised most of these by about a percentage point. If there is no ceasefire before April 2027, it seems difficult to imagine a second offensive, but a somewhat favorable ceasefire is in the realm of possibility.
0.231717
Relative Brier Score
Questions Forecasted
Scored Questions
121
Forecasts
22
Upvotes
Forecasting Activity
Forecasting Calendar
| Past Week | Past Month | Past Year | This Season | All Time | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Forecasts | 3 | 16 | 201 | 121 | 864 |
| Comments | 3 | 14 | 103 | 97 | 271 |
| Questions Forecasted | 3 | 14 | 43 | 30 | 120 |
| Upvotes on Comments By This User | 1 | 3 | 41 | 22 | 170 |
| Definitions | |||||
New Prediction
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
6%
(0%)
Moldova
1%
(0%)
Armenia
2%
(-1%)
Georgia
1%
(0%)
Kazakhstan
Why do you think you're right?
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Outside of the ceasefire scenarios, I think one thing that might move the likelihood would be pro-western or anti-Russian demonstrations or policies in any of these countries. I don't think they would change things materially, but I think it could make a difference on the margin.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
2%
(0%)
Yes
98%
(0%)
No
Why do you think you're right?
I'll stay where I am for the time being. I think that even in the most likely scenario to cause this, which I think is a ceasefire, this is still unlikely. Even still, I'm a bit higher than the crowd on the chances of a ceasefire this year and within that space, this is a plausible event.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Even though I'm quite low in absolute terms, I'm much higher than the crowd due in relative terms due to my uncertainty, so perhaps the median forecaster has good reasons to be more certain.
Files
I'm much higher than the crowd due in relative terms
Current median is at 1.34%, so I don't think you are much higher... 😉
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
0%
(0%)
1 January 2025 - 31 March 2025
0%
(0%)
1 April 2025 - 30 June 2025
11%
(+5%)
1 July 2025 - 30 September 2025
7%
(-5%)
1 October 2025 - 31 December 2025
82%
(0%)
Not before 2026
Why do you think you're right?
As others have mentioned, the chances of meaningful progress in the Trump / Putin meeting are low and Trump has been trying to lower expectations, but on the other hand, I'd guess the bar for success has been lowering as well. At this point, I think a ceasefire is the primary hope and I think it could happen as a result of this meeting.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Even though I think the likelihood is low, I'm guessing Trump would like very much even to get a very short ceasefire as a sign of progress and might try to incentives it somehow.
Files
New Badge
Star Commenter - Jul 2025
Earned for making 5+ comments in a month (rationales not included).
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
56%
Yes
44%
No
Why do you think you're right?
Based on I'm about 80% confident that this could be done if it were prioritized / funded (70% this happens), but, for all I know, this might get crowded out by other priorities (or as @belikewater pointed out, this could be derailed by war).
Files
Why might you be wrong?
It seems like this doesn't require breakthroughs, but just engineering, but maybe this is more complicated than I'm imagining. I can think of other problems that are mostly engineering challenges that have been hard to crack (e.g. fusion).
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
0%
(-1%)
Yes
100%
(+1%)
No
Why do you think you're right?
It was already unlikely to happen due to the limited time, but @404_NOT_FOUND 's recent comments convinced me that the chances are low enough that I can round them down to zero. Potentially angering the Trump administration is yet another reason why this is unlikely.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
As I've mentioned before, an announcement is a very low bar. If it happens I'll be quite surprised but every now and again a 1/250 chance happens.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
27%
(-1%)
Yes
73%
(+1%)
No
Why do you think you're right?
Lowering slightly on the lack of news. As I mentioned in my last forecast, I'm guessing the majority of Chinese military efforts between now and the end of this question will be focused on areas applicable to Taiwan.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
A focus on capabilities related to Taiwan doesn't preclude expansion in Africa, and maybe it will become a priority, particularly if investments in nearby areas are increased.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
0%
(0%)
Less than or equal to 9%
4%
(0%)
Between 10% and 19%, inclusive
78%
(0%)
Between 20% and 29%, inclusive
17%
(0%)
Between 30% and 39%, inclusive
1%
(0%)
More than or equal to 40%
Confirmed previous forecast
Files
Why do you think you're right?
My distribution is bi-modal. If the ceasefire is stable for more than 30 days, it seems like it could have a good chance of making it more than 90. I think at this point, both sides are at least interested in some kind of compromise, but they're still probably pretty far away from each other.
Why might you be wrong?