harjanim

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-0.009232

Relative Brier Score

22

Forecasts

14

Upvotes
Forecasting Activity
Forecasting Calendar
 

Past Week Past Month Past Year This Season All Time
Forecasts 0 6 91 22 328
Comments 0 1 4 1 10
Questions Forecasted 0 6 19 8 54
Upvotes on Comments By This User 0 6 49 14 80
 Definitions
New Prediction
harjanim
made their 1st forecast (view all):
Probability
Answer
5%
Yes
95%
No

I've indicated a low probability for my forecast due to the resolution criteria specifying that the election must be nationwide.

Recent reports suggest that an election will take place, but it would not be nationwide, largely due to security concerns.

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmars-next-election-may-not-be-nationwide-junta-chief-says-2024-03-25/

These security concerns appear to be set to intensify, especially given recent developments related to the Karen National Liberation Army

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/myanmar-junta-under-siege

One (perhaps remote) possibility is that the junta loses ground completely in the coming months, and that elections next year are held in a completely different political and security climate

https://www.deccanherald.com/world/the-tuesday-interview-a-new-federal-democratic-myanmar-is-emerging-juntas-days-are-numbered-india-should-stop-selling-weapons-to-it-2961163

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harjanim
made a comment:
I missed that, thanks for pointing it out to me @DKC ! :) Shall have to review more sources and see how to update my forecast.
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New Prediction

Assigning a low probability to my forecast for this question, for two main reasons:

1) Given China Mobile's involvement in the O-RAN Alliance, if Huawei wanted to join, it would have done so already. The reason offered by Huawei (at least for the public domain) is that O-RAN doesn't align with the company's priorities

https://www.telecomtv.com/content/open-ran/huawei-denies-open-ran-support-speculation-49795/

2) There could also be some weight to the argument that Huawei is deliberately staying away from O-RAN to avoid toxifying it (O-RAN is for now seen as a credible alternative to Chinese vendors for 5G, even if this doesn't make complete sense given the heavy involvement of Chinese players in the O-RAN Alliance)

https://strandconsult.dk/does-huawei-not-believe-in-open-ran-or-is-just-playing-poker-with-the-o-ran-alliance-and-policymakers/

Files
New Prediction

Maintaining my forecast.

There has been no (reported) news in the past month to suggest that Microsoft is planning to close or relocate its AI research lab in China.

As highlighted in previous forecasts, the likelihood of a complete closure or relocation is unlikely due to the significance Microsoft has traditionally attached to the Chinese market.

It's possible, however, as Microsoft builds up its resources elsewhere in the region, the importance of the AI research lab could diminish over time. For example, Microsoft has a planned expansion in Japan 

https://sg.news.yahoo.com/finance/news/microsoft-invest-2-9-bn-032821432.html

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New Prediction
harjanim
made their 4th forecast (view all):
Probability
Answer
Forecast Window
1% (+1%)
Yes
Apr 29, 2024 to Oct 29, 2024
99% (-1%)
No
Apr 29, 2024 to Oct 29, 2024

Raising my forecast marginally to match the one for the question on Saudi Arabia.

Even though the US has been pushing Saudi Arabia hard on normalisation (perhaps under the assumption that other Arab countries would follow Saudi Arabia's lead), an agreement in the next six months remains very unlikely because of the war in Gaza.

https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/04/blinken-says-us-almost-ready-saudi-rewards-israel-normalisation

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New Prediction
harjanim
made their 3rd forecast (view all):
Probability
Answer
Forecast Window
1% (0%)
Yes
Apr 26, 2024 to Oct 26, 2024
99% (0%)
No
Apr 26, 2024 to Oct 26, 2024

Maintaining my forecast for the following reasons:

1) Israel-Saudi Arabia normalisation is very unlikely to be decoupled from the war in Gaza. As long as the war continues, normalisation is off the table.

https://www.ft.com/content/821b67bd-5736-4ffd-b66f-3bb1830560d2

2) The recent retaliatory strikes by Iran further dampen the possibility of normalisation with Israel and risk unravelling progress made in recent years

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gulf-states-vulnerable-influential-seek-stop-new-iran-israel-war-2024-04-14/


Nevertheless, one factor weighing in the other direction is US pressure on Saudi Arabia to normalise relations with Israel despite what is happening in Gaza:

https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240402-us-security-adviser-to-meet-saudis-mbs-to-discuss-israel-mega-deal/

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New Badge
harjanim
earned a new badge:

Active Forecaster

New Prediction

Confirming my previous forecast, primarily due to the passage of time.

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New Badge
harjanim
earned a new badge:

Upvotes Received

New Prediction
harjanim
made their 2nd forecast (view all):
This forecast expired on Apr 30, 2024 01:30PM
Probability
Answer
Forecast Window
1% (0%)
Yes
Mar 30, 2024 to Sep 30, 2024
99% (0%)
No
Mar 30, 2024 to Sep 30, 2024

Maintaining my forecast. As highlighted in the justification for the previous forecast, the main obstacle for Israel-Saudi Arabia normalization is the Gaza conflict, which is unlikely to be resolved within the timeframe of this question.


Recent developments I came across that I felt were worth highlighting:

1) The US seems quite keen to portray that progress is being made and that the Gaza conflict is only delaying an inevitable transition towards normalization, but this seems to ignore Saudi statements that tie the fate of normalization to a resolution of not just the Gaza conflict, but the larger question surrounding Palestine's future

https://www.timesofisrael.com/during-cairo-visit-blinken-says-progress-made-on-israel-saudi-normalization/

2) The suggestion that things will change with a different government in charge in Israel might be optimistic at best

https://time.com/6960405/netanyahu-popularity-israel-gaza-gantz/

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New Prediction

Reducing the probability of my forecast, largely due to the passage of time.

Some interesting developments nevertheless:

1) Putin has reasserted control of Russian politics with the results of the latest election held earlier this month. The repression that has accompanied the election signals that he continues to maintain his grip over the political machinery of the country

https://apnews.com/article/russia-election-putin-2024-updates-ebdaae1bf12b44343b88ba471f9f0cb0

2) The recent attack on a Moscow concert venue claimed by ISIS nevertheless demonstrates cracks in the ability of Putin's regime to detect and neutralize security threats

https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/moscow-russia-shooting-03-23-24/index.html

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