Confirmed previous forecast
-0.009931
Relative Brier Score
6
Forecasts
0
Upvotes
Forecasting Activity
Forecasting Calendar
Past Week | Past Month | Past Year | This Season | All Time | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Forecasts | 25 | 34 | 360 | 128 | 668 |
Comments | 0 | 1 | 39 | 8 | 103 |
Questions Forecasted | 25 | 34 | 90 | 45 | 169 |
Upvotes on Comments By This User | 0 | 0 | 52 | 3 | 111 |
Definitions |
New Prediction
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
99%
(0%)
Less than or equal to 499
1%
(0%)
Between 500 and 999, inclusive
0%
(0%)
Between 1000 and 1499, inclusive
0%
(0%)
Between 1500 and 1999, inclusive
0%
(0%)
More than or equal to 2000
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
30%
(+10%)
Yes
70%
(-10%)
No
minor update to account for passage of time
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
Forecast Window
10%
(0%)
Yes
Apr 29, 2024 to May 29, 2024
90%
(0%)
No
Apr 29, 2024 to May 29, 2024
Confirmed previous forecast
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
Forecast Window
0%
(0%)
Yes
Apr 29, 2024 to Oct 29, 2024
100%
(0%)
No
Apr 29, 2024 to Oct 29, 2024
Confirmed previous forecast
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
Forecast Window
1%
(0%)
Yes
Apr 29, 2024 to Oct 29, 2024
99%
(0%)
No
Apr 29, 2024 to Oct 29, 2024
Confirmed previous forecast
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
1%
(0%)
Yes
99%
(0%)
No
Confirmed previous forecast
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
Forecast Window
1%
(0%)
Yes
Apr 29, 2024 to Oct 29, 2024
Confirmed previous forecast
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
Forecast Window
0%
(0%)
Yes
Apr 29, 2024 to Oct 29, 2024
Confirmed previous forecast
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
15%
(0%)
Yes
85%
(0%)
No
Confirmed previous forecast
Files
I'm going to go against the team consensus.
With indications of Russia preparing for a new summer offensive for June 2024 (although thescale and intensity is unclear, as https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2024 ) I think it is plausible that they may attack civilian infrastructure (with their usual level of precision and concern for collateral damage), especially ahead of western resupply of materiel, to draw air defenses away from the front line.
While, there have been no attacks that have resulted in this many casualties, 100 civilians "killed or injured" is a relatively low number and all long range weapons fielded by Russia are capable of imposing such a strike. Bearing this in mind, I think the possibility of meeting this mark, whether intentional or not, is not out of the reasonable bounds of possibility.
I am not sure if it matters much, but given the lack of concern given to collateral damage in Gaza by Western countries, Russia might use it as a justification for their own posture going forward; this would fall in line with traditional Russian methods of manipulation of public opinion. Ukraine may also inflate the number of injured in order to use any potential strike to their advantage -- especially as concerns of support is waning (in particularly the United States, ahead of the national elections).