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According to the Washington Post:

[Israeli PM] Benjamin Netanyahu has asked the [IDF] to provide target options. . . that would “send a message” but not cause casualties. Those options include a potential strike on a facility in Tehran or a cyberattack, according to the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the talks. “Everybody agrees that Israel must respond,” the official said. “How to respond, when to respond, is the question.”

What militates against going higher is the fact that evidence of a fire in Jul 2020 targeting potentially undeclared nuclear work in Tehran's Shadabad exurb — ~40 mi away from Parchin Military Complex & ~80 mi away from the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant for illustrative purposes — was concealed by Iranian authorities for nearly 4 years

Any Israeli response may similarly be clandestine in nature, thereby affording the Islamic Republic the opportunity to save face by concealing the outcome of such a response

Closing out with Iranian media reports:

Issuing a statement early on Sun, the IRGC said that the anti-Zionist operation was carried out against certain targets in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories

The Islamic Republic decided to pursue this escalatory course of action; will reduce accordingly if said Shahed 136 drones loiter outside of Israeli territory or the like:

Dozens of drones were airborne from Iran toward Israel on Sat night, as Israel prepared to defend against the expected Iranian strike, IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagari confirmed

A confluence of signals highlights that Iran has no intentions whatsoever of limiting its U-235 stockpile below <60% enrichment
Despite calls by the US that "Iran should downblend all, not just some, of its 60% stockpile, and stop all production of uranium enriched to 60% entirely", I wanted to draw attention to a PBS interview with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi to better understand the IAEA's inherent operational limitations:

Last month [the IAEA] said. . .that Iran had actually reduced its quantity of weapons-grade while expanding its whole nuclear program. Does that mean we're getting into a better position vis-a-vis Iran, or are you still pessimistic?

The general trend is a trend of increase of nuclear material, enriched at a very, very high level.

It has. . .many aspects, not only the amount of enriched uranium, which is very important, because this is the stuff from which nuclear weapons are made, or at least essentially for the explosive capacity. But there are other things that have to do with the capacity that my inspectors have to have a full visibility of what is going on there. And this. . .has been steadily reduced.

I don't want to mislead you or confuse the audience. . .we are inspecting, but we're not inspecting at the levels and the depth we should be given the nature of that problem.

You say, the [IAEA] has lost continuity of knowledge in relation to Iran's production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors, bellows, heavy water, and uranium ore concentrate. . . What happens when you push the Iranians and say we have to have more transparency?

If Iran does not [provide more transparency], we will be approaching a point where the [IAEA]. . .will [be] prevented from giving the credible assurance that are needed [to ensure that] the Iranian nuclear program is entirely [for] peaceful uses because [the IAEA] will have lost visibility.

I read somewhere that Iran has the capability. . .of creating with its program 13 nuclear weapons, 7 within the month of a breakout.In other words, if they break out and decide to just go for it. Tell me how soon do you think Iran could create a nuclear weapon?

Some analysts can have the luxury of saying those things[, but] Iran does not have nuclear weapons today. . .[s]o we have to be very objective here.

Iran is accumulating vast amounts of highly enriched uranium, and this is something that, of course, draws our attention because no other country, without nuclear weapons, is enriching at these high levels.

Another point I would draw attention to is that a nuclear weapon requires more than highly enriched uranium or plutonium to go bang, all right? It is a complex system that requires other things. We are [on] a trajectory that is not good. But, of course, we are not in a scenario that we have the weapons in that country.

Beyond Grossi's words, former Iranian FM Ali Akbar Salehi hinted in a televised Feb interview that the Islamic Republic has surmounted key challenges pertaining to ≥90% U-235 enrichment, "We have [crossed] all the thresholds of nuclear science and technology. Here's an example: Imagine what a car needs; it needs a chassis, an engine, a steering wheel, a gearbox. You're asking if we've made the gearbox, I say yes. Have we made the engine? Yes, but each one serves its own purpose."

This is of a piece with prior statements by Kamal Kharrazi — an advisor to Khamenei — in Jul 2022 averring that "In a few days, we were able to enrich uranium up to 60% and we can easily produce 90% enriched uranium. . .Iran has the technical means to produce a nuclear bomb, but there has been no decision by Iran to build one"

This confluence of signals undergirds my assessment that the Islamic Republic has no intentions whatsoever of limiting its U-235 stockpile below <60% enrichment

A confluence of signals highlights that Iran has no intentions whatsoever of limiting its U-235 stockpile exclusively down to ≤5% LEU
Despite calls by the US that "Iran should downblend all, not just some, of its 60% stockpile, and stop all production of uranium enriched to 60% entirely", I wanted to draw attention to a PBS interview with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi to better understand the IAEA's inherent operational limitations:

Last month [the IAEA] said. . .that Iran had actually reduced its quantity of weapons-grade while expanding its whole nuclear program. Does that mean we're getting into a better position vis-a-vis Iran, or are you still pessimistic?

The general trend is a trend of increase of nuclear material, enriched at a very, very high level.

It has. . .many aspects, not only the amount of enriched uranium, which is very important, because this is the stuff from which nuclear weapons are made, or at least essentially for the explosive capacity. But there are other things that have to do with the capacity that my inspectors have to have a full visibility of what is going on there. And this. . .has been steadily reduced.

I don't want to mislead you or confuse the audience. . .we are inspecting, but we're not inspecting at the levels and the depth we should be given the nature of that problem.

You say, the [IAEA] has lost continuity of knowledge in relation to Iran's production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors, bellows, heavy water, and uranium ore concentrate. . . What happens when you push the Iranians and say we have to have more transparency?

If Iran does not [provide more transparency], we will be approaching a point where the [IAEA]. . .will [be] prevented from giving the credible assurance that are needed [to ensure that] the Iranian nuclear program is entirely [for] peaceful uses because [the IAEA] will have lost visibility.

I read somewhere that Iran has the capability. . .of creating with its program 13 nuclear weapons, 7 within the month of a breakout.


In other words, if they break out and decide to just go for it. Tell me how soon do you think Iran could create a nuclear weapon?

Some analysts can have the luxury of saying those things[, but] Iran does not have nuclear weapons today. . .[s]o we have to be very objective here.

Iran is accumulating vast amounts of highly enriched uranium, and this is something that, of course, draws our attention because no other country, without nuclear weapons, is enriching at these high levels.

Another point I would draw attention to is that a nuclear weapon requires more than highly enriched uranium or plutonium to go bang, all right? It is a complex system that requires other things. We are [on] a trajectory that is not good. But, of course, we are not in a scenario that we have the weapons in that country.

Beyond Grossi's words, former Iranian FM Ali Akbar Salehi hinted in a televised Feb interview that the Islamic Republic has surmounted key challenges pertaining to ≥90% U-235 enrichment, "We have [crossed] all the thresholds of nuclear science and technology. Here's an example: Imagine what a car needs; it needs a chassis, an engine, a steering wheel, a gearbox. You're asking if we've made the gearbox, I say yes. Have we made the engine? Yes, but each one serves its own purpose."

This is of a piece with prior statements by Kamal Kharrazi — an advisor to Khamenei — in Jul 2022 averring that "In a few days, we were able to enrich uranium up to 60% and we can easily produce 90% enriched uranium. . .Iran has the technical means to produce a nuclear bomb, but there has been no decision by Iran to build one"

This confluence of signals undergirds my assessment that the Islamic Republic has no intentions whatsoever of limiting its U-235 stockpile exclusively down to ≤5% LEU

A confluence of signals highlights that the IAEA will act as a lagging indicator if and/or when Iran unveils any ≥90% HEU enrichment capabilities

Given that this query resolves based on IAEA reports as detailed by @Jim, I wanted to draw attention to a PBS interview with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi to better understand the limitations in which Grossi inherently operates:

Last month [the IAEA] said. . .that Iran had actually reduced its quantity of weapons-grade while expanding its whole nuclear program. Does that mean we're getting into a better position vis-a-vis Iran, or are you still pessimistic?

The general trend is a trend of increase of nuclear material, enriched at a very, very high level.

It has. . .many aspects, not only the amount of enriched uranium, which is very important, because this is the stuff from which nuclear weapons are made, or at least essentially for the explosive capacity. But there are other things that have to do with the capacity that my inspectors have to have a full visibility of what is going on there. And this. . .has been steadily reduced.

I don't want to mislead you or confuse the audience. . .we are inspecting, but we're not inspecting at the levels and the depth we should be given the nature of that problem.

You say, the [IAEA] has lost continuity of knowledge in relation to Iran's production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors, bellows, heavy water, and uranium ore concentrate. . . What happens when you push the Iranians and say we have to have more transparency?

If Iran does not [provide more transparency], we will be approaching a point where the [IAEA]. . .will [be] prevented from giving the credible assurance that are needed [to ensure that] the Iranian nuclear program is entirely [for] peaceful uses because [the IAEA] will have lost visibility.

I read somewhere that Iran has the capability. . .of creating with its program 13 nuclear weapons, 7 within the month of a breakout.

In other words, if they break out and decide to just go for it. Tell me how soon do you think Iran could create a nuclear weapon?

Some analysts can have the luxury of saying those things[, but] Iran does not have nuclear weapons today. . .[s]o we have to be very objective here.

Iran is accumulating vast amounts of highly enriched uranium, and this is something that, of course, draws our attention because no other country, without nuclear weapons, is enriching at these high levels.

Another point I would draw attention to is that a nuclear weapon requires more than highly enriched uranium or plutonium to go bang, all right? It is a complex system that requires other things. We are [on] a trajectory that is not good. But, of course, we are not in a scenario that we have the weapons in that country.

Beyond Grossi's words, former Iranian FM Ali Akbar Salehi hinted in a televised Feb interview that the Islamic Republic has surmounted key challenges pertaining to ≥90% U-235 enrichment, "We have [crossed] all the thresholds of nuclear science and technology. Here's an example: Imagine what a car needs; it needs a chassis, an engine, a steering wheel, a gearbox. You're asking if we've made the gearbox, I say yes. Have we made the engine? Yes, but each one serves its own purpose."

This is of a piece with prior statements by Kamal Kharrazi — an advisor to Khamenei — in Jul 2022 averring that "In a few days, we were able to enrich uranium up to 60% and we can easily produce 90% enriched uranium. . .Iran has the technical means to produce a nuclear bomb, but there has been no decision by Iran to build one"

This confluence of signals undergirds my assessment that IAEA reports will — at best — serve as a lagging indicator if and/or when Iran unveils any ≥90% HEU enrichment capabilities, hence the decision to hold at a Cromwellian 1% akin to some of @cmeinel's forecasts elsewhere

The likelihood of a sociopolitical understanding possibly militates against the MFP rallying its supporters more vociferously ahead of any potential dissolution decision
Owing to the lack of near-term catalysts following the Constitutional Court's call for the EC to resubmit its petition seeking the MFP's dissolution, one conjecture as to why the MFP hasn't already begun rallying its supporters ahead of this ostensibly mortal blow entails the likelihood that a sociopolitical understanding may have been reached

Although comments from MFP members indicate that no thought had yet been given towards establishing a backup party, former FFP founder Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit later presents that exact option as just another bureaucratic nuisance to overcome while assuming that MFP's disbandment is inevitable; prior reports also speculate on the rapport between Juangroongruangkit & PTP linchpin Thaksin Shinawatra

One could imagine, then, that the negative emotional valence needed to draw protest turnout #s following MFP's dissolution might be diminished if, say, a theoretical 'Forward Forever Party' was not only waiting in the wings but also widely understood by MFP stalwarts as the next logical step — especially if this speculative new party announcement occurs within the next 12 months to prevent de jure political disenfranchisement, which may catalyze more widespread anti-government protests

The latest color:

The EC. . .voted unanimously to seek the dissolution of the [MFP] following a verdict by the Constitutional Court over the party’s Article 112 stand. . .The EC also called on the Constitutional Court to ban Move Forward executives from contesting in future elections.

Moreover, according to former EC member Somchai Srisutthiyakorn, "The Constitutional Court could hand its verdict on EC’s petition in less than 2 months"