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While there is not yet a clear signal about when a new electoral session could take place, it would seem that there has been an intensification of the discussions and meetings surrounding the process. On its website, Naharnet [1] highlights 12 news specific to Lebanon. 4 of those are currently about the presidential election which is much more than usual. This at least partly signifies that something is moving, albeit slowly.
Another interesting tidbit of information I discovered comes from the notion that the quintet of ambassadors from the five-nation contact group (US, France, Saudi Arabia, Q atar, and Egypt) tasked with helping the Lebanese politics solve the impasse, have the power to impose sanctions on those that appear to deliberately obstruct the process [2]. I'm not sure about whether this option could be used, or if it's going to have any meaningful effect, but it has been mentioned lately [3] so it's something to keep in mind.
[1] Naharnet.com[2] Five nation group on Lebanon says to penalise those obstructing presidential election[3] Only Hezbollah can disrupt the 'Quintet' and the presidential election process

Almost two weeks have passed since the Iranian drone attack on Israel and the possibility of reintroducing snapback sanctions against the regime was not meaningfully mentioned anywhere. 

As a result, I'm slightly scaling back my forecast while keeping it higher than it was before in consideration of the uncertain geopolitical scenario.

It will be interesting to understand how Iran will behave concerning its nuclear program now. If Iran's antagonization of the IAEA and the JCPOA community escalates, it would create a scenario in which the reimposition of sanctions is possible. 

Confirming my previous forecast.

It would seem that the Iranian regime is once again toughening its stance on the correct wearing of the hijab and thus intensifying its "war on women".

With international tensions surging in the Middle East, Iranian authorities this month announced a nationwide operation to enforce the wearing of the Islamic headscarf by women, which has been obligatory since shortly after the 1979 Islamic revolution.

Activists have reported that women have been arrested and taken away to police stations by the so-called morality police with the Persian hashtag "war against women" trending on social media. [1]

The escalation in the conflict against Israel is all but strengthening the feeling of national union.

Tehran's strikes on Israel likely mean more problems for ordinary citizens, already struggling under a deeply unpopular Islamic regime.

While state media depict mass celebrations, a significant portion of the public is deeply concerned about the economic fallout, more internal repression and possible retaliatory action by Israel that could drag the country into war.Some in Iran worry a more direct military confrontation with Israel will allow the Islamic Republic to quash internal challenges more easily under the pretext of avoiding instability or extraordinary war conditions. [2]

In conclusion, Iranians perceive the current situation as a threat. The rial is losing value at a quick pace [3], and further sanctions aimed perhaps at limiting its oil exports [4] could exacerbate the persisting economic crisis. The ingredients for the explosion of new protests are all there, it is simply not as unlikely as the current crowd consensus suggests.

[1] Nobel laureate urges Iranians to protest 'war against women'

[2] Something to celebrate? How is the Israel attack viewed in Iran?

[3] Unofficial USD - RIAL exchange rate

[4] US and EU eye new sanctions on Iran after attack on Israel

One week left. Nothing relevant in the news.

Nothing relevant in the news with a single week left. It is almost impossible that such a protest would emerge out of nothing.

China is unlikely to release a new quota for exports before the closing of this question. Even if it were to do so early, there is very little time left for the price to spike that dramatically. 

The market proved to be more resilient to bad news than it has been in the past, so $1k is a very high threshold in the short amount of time left.

I'm sort of reluctant to move a forecast about a market-related event down to 0% with over 2 months left, so I'm waiting for the next update.

Either way, this is exceptionally unlikely to happen.

Meta might start to label posts that have been written using its proprietary LLM as such, but this would not count toward a positive resolution of the question.

The most likely scenario for a positive resolution is if Meta uses the knowledge of the inner workings of Llama to determine if any posts have been written using it. Given that nothing appears to be in the works at the moment, and that the Oversight Board would take some time to decide on the best course of action, then this remains very unlikely to happen over the next month or so.

The dangerous tit-for-tat escalation between Iran and Israel highlights once again the fact that a strategic alliance between Israel and SA could enhance Israel's security while fostering broader regional cooperation.

This is substantiated by the Biden administration making one last push to try and achieve the impossible normalization.

The Biden administration is intensifying efforts to broker a groundbreaking deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia, aiming to solidify a historic normalization of relations, according to a report from The Wall Street Journal on Thursday.

According to sources familiar with the matter, the White House is actively engaging Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, urging him to commit to a renewed push for Palestinian statehood. In exchange, Riyadh would extend diplomatic recognition to Israel. [2]

This shows that despite the complex conflictual situation, there is still a strong willingness to resume the process. The US is trying to broker a deal between the two countries, which are therefore not officially in direct communication.

But any acknowledgment by both parties that this process could be resumed would solve this question, irrespective of whether normalization is achieved.

[1] White House Makes Fresh Push for Historic Deal to Forge Saudi-Israel Ties

[2] Biden makes new push for historic Israeli-Saudi normalization deal

• As pointed out by @MrLittleTexas the resolution criteria set a relatively low bar for this question to be resolved positively. Not only it is sufficient that Huawei collaborates in  "testing equipment with O-RAN standards", but it is simply sufficient that it "announces a collaboration" which is an even easier bar to clear. 
• There is already ongoing speculation that Huawei might be interested in joining the O-RAN initiative, this has to be based on the plausibility that it could happen relatively soon.
• How much of a risk does O-RAN pose to Huawei's competitiveness? Probably not as much as some rationales seem to suggest.

Looking beyond the logistical & financial problems associated with ORAN, one question is rarely asked by tech pundits: “Does ORAN actually undermine Huawei?” If the ORAN architecture and business model overcome the aforementioned logistical problems and successfully deliver on the promise of cost savings, what stops Huawei from also adopting the ORAN model?

After all, Huawei is a one-stop shop that offers a complete suite of products covering the entire 5G network value chain. There are no technical or market barriers that prevent Huawei from adopting the ORAN architecture, then selling its own RAN components in a piecemeal fashion, if it is profitable to do so.

In fact, in an open-architecture world, Huawei components may find their way into networks that are traditionally monopolized by Ericsson or Nokia, just as the latter can penetrate 5G network markets currently occupied by Huawei. [1]

Here's the same concept expressed differently.

The idea that a disaggregation of RAN technology will minimize western dependence on Chinese technology is optimistic at best. Whether we consider single-vendor or Open RAN technology, China remains best positioned in the global market. The barriers to market entry for Radio Access Network technology, as well as its components, are high. Entry requires expertise and is capital intensive. [2]

There is also a broader theme about China. Does this negatively impact Chinese companies? Some state-controlled US-sanctioned Chinese companies are already participating in the O-RAN Alliance.

Not only are 36 company participants in the O-RAN Alliance headquartered in China, but some of its most active members are subject to US sanctions. A recently published analysis finds that at least two-thirds of the Chinese O-RAN Alliance members have elements of state-ownership, and six are outright public institutions or agencies. At least 16 O-RAN Alliance members have public links to the Chinese security apparatus. Strikingly, all three of China’s main mobile operators, China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom, participate in the O-RAN Alliance. [2]

Also, here's a Huawei Forum post from less than 6 months ago where they claim what follows.

Huawei actively participates in Open RAN (O-RAN) initiatives, contributing to open interfaces and promoting interoperability. [3]

In conclusion, O-RAN does not probably represent as much of a risk for Huawei as one might initially speculate. Their direct involvement in the O-RAN alliance seems unlikely, but it is far from impossible, particularly given how many other major players in the sector are actively in it.

Whether Huawei decides to join in or not depends on many factors. The faster O-RAN gains traction, the more likely Huawei will be interested in being part of it. 

[1] ORAN: Hardly a Magic Bullet vs Huawei

[2] Open RAN – Not Solving the “5G China Challenge”

[3] Huawei's Comprehensive RAN Portfolio

BASE RATE

@Akkete  found dates that would seem to indicate the opening dates of various OTICs.

13 OTICs were inaugurated in August 2021 or later, they combined for roughly 5,300 working days and produced 2 certificates.

There are 8 OTICs in North America which will work for roughly 2,800 days between now and the end of the question. The base rate chance to see a certificate coming out of them would be 65%.

This approach completely ignores all the OTICs that were already operating before August 2021 and all the certificates they released. The assumption is that there is a lead time between the beginning of operation and the release of the first certificate: not knowing when they started operating might significantly skew the results.

The Japanese OTIC released its first certificate 178 days after beginning operation, and the Korean one after 464 days. It would be pointless to extract any meaningful signal from this data, but at least we know that all the North American OTIS have been operating long enough to be plausibly releasing certificates today.

FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

12/13 of the certificates have been released by Asian OTICs and that's a fact. The reasons are unclear to me. National security and business interest, as suggested by @PeterStamp, are certainly two valuable hypotheses. But one could make a broader point about some base rate "population" statistics: how much each country invests in R&D? How much of the GDP comes from telecom companies? How many large telecom companies and start-ups are working on these issues?

This brings me to my second consideration. 8 OTICs have been opened in the US, all during 2023. This has to be justified by the existence of a significant demand for the services they offer, and certifications are one of such services. If the O-RAN community wanted to simply establish a footprint in the US, they could have opened a single center, as seems to be the case for most countries. The almost simultaneous opening of 8 centers in NA is significant in this regard and might be interpreted as making this question more likely to be resolved positively. 

After all, the number of start-up companies in the US dwarfs that of any other country and they cumulatively output massive technological advances. So it is plausible that some of them are currently working to get one of those certificates.