o-maverick

Lowering the odds due to the slight de-escalation of the tensions recently.

The only scenario in which I see this coming true in such a short timeframe is if Ukraine used its ATACMS long-range missiles to target Russian territory/civilians/infrastructure. Then, Russia might consider a retaliatory measure of such kind. However, even under this scenario, it would need to be a large attack to kill/injure 100+ people.

Another (unlikely) scenario would be a total escalation of the conflict, which doesn't seem feasible at the moment, given the US's recent military aid approval.

I agree with @HorribleHarry !! Russia has its hands full with Ukraine.

However, April 2027 (2 years from now) could be a deadline long enough time for them to get to the Odesa oblast (which borders Moldova) or even to settle the Ukrainian conflict.

As of now, I see no reason why Russia would invade Armenia, Georgia, or Kazakhstan - unless they undertook some drastic gestures against Russia. Besides that, these countries have eyes and ears; they can look at what's happening in Ukraine and perhaps "test the waters" to find out what reaction they'd get.

On the matter of Transnistria, there are a few aspects to consider. Moldova is not part of NATO or the EU - and does not seem to be a good candidate for any of those organizations. Plus, Russia has stationed troops in Transnistria. There's no urgency in annexing it to their territory (especially considering that there's a large chunk of "unconquered" Ukrainian territory between them).

Therefore, the odds look rather low at the moment for such invasions.

I cannot foresee any scenario in which Russia would consider invading the Baltic nations.

However, given its land connection to the oblast of Kaliningrad, I'm placing only 1% in Lithuania.

This is an 8-month window question. The events that might shift the war balance will occur in late 2024/early 2025.

US election day is scheduled for November 5, and Biden will do everything he can to project strength and counter Russia. Biden also got a significant victory yesterday (24/04/2024): approving the 61 billion dollar military aid package to Ukraine will likely buy Ukraine some more time against the Russians.

Besides that, if Trump is elected, he will only be inaugurated on January 20, 2025. If he indeed decides to withdraw the US support from Ukraine (which would be a good moment for a Russian ground offensive), it will only happen next year and, therefore, after the question is resolved.

Given the recent military aid package approval, it would be more strategic (and cost-efficient) for Putin to wait for an eventual Trump victory before considering such an offensive. And the Russians don't seem to be in a rush. They have a full-fledged military industry complex, working 24/7 to provide the Russians with the necessary equipment. Meaning they have the resources to afford time on the battlefield. Under the current circumstances, such an offensive would cost a great many Russian lives and a large chunk of their military budget.

Plus, the recent Russian advances on the battlefield are a reflection of the US delay in approving a new round of military aid. It will take a few weeks until this aid can be fully deployed to the frontline, and the Ukrainian forces will likely struggle to contain the Russian offensive in the near term, but will eventually do so. 

I'm with @ctsats and @404_NOT_FOUND on this question. Excellent rationales, by the way. 

Beyond what has already been said, the US government seems to be giving a lot of incentives for establishing Open RAN technology in North America (this very question is evidence of that).

The US push to de-couple from Chinese technology will likely grow in the following years. So, for me, the likelihood of OTIC issuing a new O-RAN certificate until 31 March 2025 is high.

Upon approaching this matter, two key questions arise: Why would Huawei want to join the O-RAN Alliance? And why would it not want to do it? Let me address some of these issues...

- Huawei is doing quite well in terms of profit and market share in the telecom business. They are the leading industry that is at the tip of the spear when it comes to developing 5G technology. They are, by a significant margin, the largest telecom company in the world. They have roughly a third of the global market share, and their share only grew after the US banned it. So why would they want to join the Alliance? What is the real advantage (or market pressure) for them to do so? It is not uncommon to see companies with such market power isolating themselves at the top from the rest. And they do it because they can.

- The tensions (and the de-coupling process) between the US and China are set to grow significantly in the following years. From my point of view, this is a crucial factor when approaching this question. Given its size and importance, Huawei is a company under the protection and scrutiny of the Chinese government. Add to that the fact that 5G is a matter of national security for both the US and China. That said...

• The US's distrust of Huawei (as seen in its ban) will not change if the Chinese company joins the Alliance. However, would it make a difference for their business in the rest of the world? I'm not so sure.
• If the Chinese see the O-RAN Alliance as a political liability, they will likely hamper cooperation. "Interoperability" could also be perceived as a way of sharing technological secrets with competitors - of giving them better conditions to compete. And if Huawei is in the game to leverage its dominant position, it will likely not join the Alliance.

- Huawei's technology is already aligned with some O-RAN principles. And they seem to be doing quite well without joining the Alliance. What difference would it make for them in joining this partnership or not? They don't seem so evident as of now.

Given all these aspects, I'd say the likelihood of a cooperation initiative seems rather low.

It just happened.